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CASHING IN ON CONVICTS: PRIVATIZATION, PUNISHMENT,  
AND THE PEOPLE 
 
Laura I Appleman* 
 
Abstract 
For-profit prisons, jails, and alternative corrections present a 
disturbing commodification of the criminal justice system. Though part of 
a modern trend, privatized corrections has well-established roots 
traceable to slavery, Jim Crow, and current racially-based inequities. This 
monetizing of the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies 
has had deleterious effects on offenders, communities, and the proper 
functioning of punishment in our society. Criminal justice privatization 
severs an essential link between the people and criminal punishment. 
When we remove the imposition of punishment from the people and 
delegate it to private actors, we sacrifice the core criminal justice values 
of expressive, restorative retribution, the voice and interests of the 
community, and systemic transparency and accountability. This Article 
shows what is lost when private, for-profit entities are allowed to take on 
the traditional community function of imposing and regulating 
punishment. By banking on bondage, private prisons and jails remove the 
local community from criminal justice, and perpetuate the extreme 




In the pivotal opening scene in George R. R. Martin’s Game of Thrones, Lord 
Eddard Stark, Warden of the North, explains to his young son Bran why he must put 
on the face of the “King’s Justice,” and punish (behead) a deserter with his own 
hands, instead of handing the job off to a hired executioner: 
 
The question was not why the man had to die, but why I must do it.” Bran 
had no answer for that. “King Robert has a headsman,” he said, 
uncertainly. “He does,” his father admitted . . . . “Yet our way is the older 
way. The blood of the First Men still flows in the veins of the Starks, and 
we hold to the belief that the man who passes the sentence should 
                                                   
* © 2018 Laura I Appleman. Associate Dean of Faculty Research & Professor of Law, 
Willamette University. J.D., Yale Univ.; B.A., M.A., English, Univ. of Pennsylvania. Thanks 
to Stephanos Bibas, Curtis Bridgeman, David Friedman, Carissa Hessick, Kate Levine, 
Michael Mannheimer, Mark Movsesian, Alice Ristroph, Judith Resnik, Jocelyn Simonson, 
and Norman Williams, as well as the participants in CrimProf 7 and the faculty of St. John’s 
University School of Law, for their thoughtful comments and critiques. Thanks also to 
Willamette Law for its research support. 
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swing the sword. If you would take a man’s life, you owe it to him to look 
into his eyes and hear his final words.1 
 
Eddard Stark professes and upholds a fundamental aspect of our criminal 
justice system: punishment must be adjudicated, imposed, and regulated by the 
people. Sometimes this justice is directly imposed by the people, through the 
auspices of a grand or petit jury; sometimes this justice is enacted more distantly, 
through the hands of the local or state-elected government. But all of it is done in 
the people’s name, and only through their power. 
The recent rise of privatizing punishment—spanning from for-profit 
incarceration to privatized probation to private post-release supervision, recovery 
homes, and parole—severs the essential link between the people and criminal 
punishment. To paraphrase George R.R. Martin, we pass the sentence but sell, far 
too cheaply, our right to swing the sword. In bartering away the right to enact and 
regulate offenders’ punishment, by granting that right to private corrections 
companies instead of the state and local community, we lose the democratic 
legitimacy that undergirds our system of criminal justice. When we remove the 
imposition of punishment from the people and delegate it to private actors, we 
sacrifice the core criminal justice values of expressive, restorative retribution, the 
voice and interests of the community, and systemic transparency and accountability.  
Though part of a modern trend, privatized corrections has well-established 
roots traceable to slavery, Jim Crow, and current racially-based inequities. The use 
of forced inmate labor in private prisons is distinctly troubling, given that a high 
percentage of minorities are imprisoned in private correctional institutions. 
Monetizing the physical incarceration and regulation of human bodies has had 
serious, deleterious effects on offenders, communities, and the proper functioning 
of punishment in our society. 
Policy makers, legislators, and academics all have raised concerns about the 
rising tide of privatizing corrections. Although the ramifications of privatized 
criminal justice have begun to be explored, little attention has been paid to the 
negative impact upon the local community, particularly low-income communities 
and communities of color. When we look at privatizing corrections through this lens, 
however, we find additional reasons why the outsourcing of punishment to private 
entities, by stepping upon rights traditionally reserved to the lay citizenry, presents 
enormous problems for the proper administration of justice.  
Privatized prisons, jails, and alternative corrections trample on our long-held 
tradition of having all punishment decided by the local community. The imposition 
of punishment onto incarcerated offenders by private, for-profit companies destroys 
the established patterns of community involvement and control. The principle 
behind our system of criminal justice—that the community should determine all 
punishment for an offender—has import for all aspects of punishment, including that 
meted out post-sentencing.  
                                                   
1 GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 18 (1996) (emphasis added). 
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When offenders are punished by private entities, it lessens the expressive, 
restorative, retributive message normally sent by the community, since the offender 
is punished by a for-profit, private entity. The community loses both its voice and 
its means of participation. In addition, when we privatize punishment, the offender 
does not feel the condemnation of the local community, but instead concludes that 
her punishment is based on the profit motive of a private business. A critical social 
message is lost.  
Furthermore, the majority of our private prisons and jails fail to meet minimum 
benchmarks on decreasing violence, reducing recidivism, and otherwise fulfilling 
the role of retributive punishment, even compared to the low standards established 
by public corrections. Shortcuts are frequently taken, ostensibly in the pursuit of 
profit, that reduce the quality of life for offenders. Regulation of private prisons, 
jails, and alternative corrections is usually minimal, sometimes with deadly results.  
This Article explores what society loses when it allows private, for-profit 
entities to take on the traditional community function of imposing and regulating 
punishment. The physical imposition of punishment has traditionally and 
historically been performed by the community, or by local government chosen by 
the people. Only recently have we begun to outsource this right to private business, 
leading to deeply troubling results.  
Part I of this Article explores the perils of privatization in criminal punishment, 
examining the growing reach of for-profit companies in not only private prisons, but 
also jails, halfway houses, probation, and post-release supervision. This Part 
additionally scrutinizes the outsourcing of vital services by both private and public 
facilities. 
Part II shows how privatization of correctional facilities and their services has 
had strong negative effects on offender rehabilitation and reintegration into the 
community. This Part demonstrates some of the negative results of private 
corrections, including higher rates of recidivism, more damage to families and 
communities, and higher monetary costs than promised. 
Part III contends that the community’s role in imposing expressive, restorative 
retribution on offenders provides some important theoretical and policy reasons why 
the imposition and regulation of punishment cannot be outsourced to private entities. 
This Part also briefly reviews the sordid history of private prisons, showing how the 
privatization of criminal justice has always been rooted in slavery and Jim Crow. 
Part IV examines the critical role played by local community-level social 
processes in enacting and regulating criminal punishment. This Part carefully 
explores the interconnection between delegation, democracy, and the community, 
and concludes that crucial public values such as transparency, public accountability, 
and legitimacy all suffer when private entities control local punishment. 
Taking a different approach, Part V merges theory with practicality, exploring 
how communities can become better engaged in regulating the punishment delivered 
to wrongdoers in private correctional facilities. If society is to truly improve our 
criminal justice institutions, then we must reintegrate the local community into all 
aspects of criminal justice, including how and where we punish offenders.  
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Once unmasked, the quietly expanding realm of private, for-profit corrections 
reveals a crisis of humanitarian, criminal justice, and democratic legitimacy. 
Overlooked and undetected by the average citizen, these for-profit correctional 
facilities are the antithesis of our original system of criminal justice, papering over 
dangerous and inhumane treatment with the false promise of cost-savings. By 
banking on bondage, private prisons, jails, and alternative corrections remove the 
local community from criminal justice, and perpetuate the extreme inequities hidden 
within the criminal system. 
 
I.  THE PERILS OF PRIVATIZATION: DANGER, DEATH, AND DERELICTION OF DUTY 
 
“It’s sardine time. . . . We a for-profit prison now. We ain’t people no 
more. We bulk items.”2 
 
Running a correctional facility differs from running a municipal sewage 
authority. The moral, retributive, restorative psychological, and physical aspects of 
enacting community-determined punishment on human offenders makes managing 
corrections a complex, delicate, and extremely difficult task at the best of times. To 
do all of this while simultaneously prioritizing profit is seemingly impossible. 
And yet, in troubled financial times, the lure of privatized punishment for local, 
state, and federal government seems irresistible. Private prisons, jails, probation, 
parole, and post-relief supervision have boomed in the past twenty years, even as 
incarceration rates nationwide have begun to decrease. From 1999–2010, the 
number of offenders held in private prisons increased by eighty percent, compared 
to eighteen percent for the overall prison population, a much smaller rate of growth.3  
 
A.  Squeezing Profits Out of Prisons 
 
Approximately 193,000 offenders are currently incarcerated in private prisons,4 
both state and federal. This number, however, does not take into account the many 
more offenders who come into the orbit of privatized punishment, which includes 
                                                   
2 Orange Is the New Black: Work that Body for Me (Netflix web series June 17, 2016); 
see also Meredith Blake, How ‘Orange Is the New Black’ and Other Shows Raise Awareness 
of Criminal Justice and Prison Issues, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/la-et-st-orange-is-the-new-black-and-prison-
awareness-20160616-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZU7J-FMHM]. 
3 CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS 
IN AMERICA 1 (2012), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Too-Good-
to-be-True-Private-Prisons-in-America.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AEM-HM5T]. 
4  The most recent numbers are from FY 2015. E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2015 28 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CUG-D843]; Maurice Chammah, What You 
Need to Know About the Private Prison Phase-Out, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/08/18/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-private-
prison-phase-out#.xe2xWry5a [https://perma.cc/7ANQ-VYWN]. 
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private jails, private probation, private post-release supervision, and private 
rehabilitation/halfway houses, as well as the outsourcing of critical prisoner services 
such as transport, healthcare, telephony, and food. Roughly eight percent of all 
inmates are held in private correctional facilities,5 and the number is likely to grow,6 
as are company profits. Total revenues for private corrections are over $3.3 billion 
per year,7 and private prison executives at the leading companies rake in enormous 
compensation packages, in some cases totaling millions of dollars.8 Profits are ripe 
for the taking when it comes to privatizing punishment. 
 
1.  Big Money for Big Companies 
 
Who benefits from the continued growth of privatized punishment? Primarily, 
it is private, for-profit corrections companies. The two largest publicly traded 
players, private prison operators Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”)9 and 
the GEO Group,10 have a combined market capitalization of almost $5.8 billion,11 
                                                   
5  Shane Bauer, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard—Ch. 2: Prison 
Experiments, MOTHER JONES (July 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/ 
cca-private-prisons-corrections-corporation-inmates-investigation-bauer/#chapter-2 
[https://perma.cc/EXY3-QJXA]. 
6 Indeed, following Donald J. Trump’s election, private prison stocks soared; CCA’s 
stock rose 43%, and the GEO Group’s stock rose 21%. See Jeff Sommer, Trump’s Win Gives 
Stocks in Private Prison Companies a Reprieve, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/your-money/trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-private-
prison-companies-a-reprieve.html [https://perma.cc/9FQD-TQ6Y]. 
7 Michael Cohen, How For-Profit Prisons Have Become the Biggest Lobby No One Is 
Talking About, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery 
thing/wp/2015/04/28/how-for-profit-prisons-have-become-the-biggest-lobby-no-one-is-
talking-about/?utm_term=.0b923c4c3076 [https://perma.cc/W2ZH-Q6Q9]. 
8  DAVID SHAPIRO, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE 
PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LD6-LLMB]. 
9 CORECIVIC, http://www.corecivic.com/ [https://perma.cc/66P9-9GYH] (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2017). In October 2016, CCA changed its name to CoreCivic, to better reflect its 
diversification into areas like inmate transportation and residential re-entry programs for 
former inmates. See Bethany Davis, Correction Corporation of American Rebrands as 
CoreCivic, CCA (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.cca.com/insidecca/corrections-corporation-of-
America-rebrands-as-corecivic [https://perma.cc/PZT7-2BFU]; Sommer, supra note 6. 
10 Geo Group, GEO GROUP, INC., http://www.GEOgroup.com/ [https://perma.cc/RW29 
-EH8S] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
11 David Segal, Prison Vendors See Continuing Signs of a Captive Market, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/business/prison-vendors-see-
continued-signs-of-a-captive-market.html [https://perma.cc/6DDW-J7YA]. 
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controlling over seventy-five percent of the private prison business.12 These two 
prison privatizers made over $360 million profit in 2015 alone.13  
Who else profits from these private prison companies? Among other 
individuals, many unknowing mutual fund holders. CCA’s largest investor is The 
Vanguard Group, which owns fourteen percent of the company’s stock, worth 
approximately $447 million in 2015.14 The Vanguard Group also holds eighteen 
percent of the GEO Group’s stock, worth around $665 million in 2017.15 Blackrock 
Inc., an investment firm, holds approximately eleven percent of GEO Group’s stock, 
valued at $332 million dollars.16 Thus the private corrections conundrum is one that 
affects many Americans, whether directly or, more remotely, in their stock or 
investment portfolios. 
CCA is the largest private corrections company in the United States, running 
private correctional facilities all over the country, and owning a total of 61.17 Its 
track record in running these prisons, however, is insalubrious, most recently 
exposed by a journalist working undercover as a private prison guard in one of 
CCA’s Louisiana prisons.18 CCA’s main competitor, GEO Group, has been equally 
dogged with problems in properly running and supervising its facilities.  
Private corrections companies come in sizes large and small. Apart from CCA 
and the GEO Group, there are numerous smaller players to help split up the 
remaining pieces of the private prison pie. Smaller companies, including 
Management & Training Corporation, LCS Correctional Services, and Emerald 
Corrections, hold multiple prison contracts throughout the country.19 Their prison 
practices have proven equally troubling. 
The Louisiana-based LaSalle Corrections, for example, owns local prisons that 
incarcerate nearly 1 out of 7 prisoners in the state, providing minimum services for 
bottom dollar:  
  
                                                   
12 JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON 
PRIVATIZED PRISONS 4 (2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5Q9R-RF4Q]. 
13  Donald Cohen, It’s Been a Rough Few Weeks for the Private Prison Industry, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/its-been-
a-rough-few-week_b_11121034.html [https://perma.cc/J8U9-WBE8]. 
14 The Corrections Corporation of America, by the Numbers, MOTHER JONES (July 
2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-corrections-corperation-america-
private-prisons-company-profile [https://perma.cc/V2NM-Y853]. 
15 The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/ 
GEO/holders?ltr=1 [https://perma.cc/749Q-B5HV] (last visited March 2, 2018). 
16 Id.  
17 Clara Jeffrey, Why We Sent a Reporter to Work as a Private Prison Guard, MOTHER 
JONES (July 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-private-prisons-
investigative-journalism-editors-note [https://perma.cc/93T3-SM3H]. 
18 Id.  
19 MASON, supra note 3, at 2.  
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If you are sentenced to state time in Louisiana, odds are you will be placed 
in a local prison—a low-budget, for-profit enterprise where you are likely 
to languish in your bunk, day after day, year after year, bored out of your 
skull with little chance to learn a trade or otherwise improve yourself.20  
 
More than half of all Louisiana prisoners are housed in these bare-bones local 
prisons and jails.21 
Large or small, one interest held in common by all these private correction 
companies is a desire to freeze U.S. incarceration policies. For-profit prison 
companies have lobbied heavily to try to ensure that meaningful sentencing reform 
fails, since this would shrink their business.22 Because private prison companies 
exist for money-making purposes, “policies that maintain or increase incarceration 
boost their revenues; from a business perspective, the economic and social costs of 
mass incarceration are ‘externalities’ that aren’t figured into their corporate bottom 
line.”23 Profit margins, not prisoner welfare, are their primary focus. 
In part, this emphasis on the bottom line has motivated these companies to 
expand into halfway houses, jails, rehabilitation centers, and other correctional 
alternatives. As the country begins to wrestle meaningfully with shorter, alternative 
sentencing, private corrections companies want to ensure they continue to capture 
their slice of the market.  
 
2.  Violence, Sexual Assault, and Homicide 
 
Even by the minimal requirements of correctional habitability, private 
correctional facilities routinely provide prisoners an extremely low quality of living. 
The ratio of corrections officers to inmates tends to be dangerously disproportional, 
and reports of squalor, rape, and inmate uprisings have been a continued hallmark, 
falling below the standards of government-run prisons.24 In twenty-one states, local 
and federal investigations, official reviews, security reports, and lawsuits against 
private prisons and their corporate overseers have recently unveiled a “startling 
pattern” of riots, sexual assault, and homicide.25 
                                                   
20 Cindy Chang, North Louisiana Family Is a Major Force in the State’s Vast Prison 
Industry, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 14, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/05/ 
jonesboro_family_is_a_major_fo.html [https://perma.cc/TFP8-SEU9]. 
21 Id.  
22 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES  3 (2011), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2AV-W558]; Cohen, supra note 7.  
23 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 22, at 12. 
24 See Pat Beall, Prison Enterprise a Powerful Force in Backrooms, Behind Bars, PALM 
BEACH POST (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/prison-
enterprise-a-powerful-forcein-backrooms-beh/nbWyF/ [https://perma.cc/Y4F9-7FEU]. 
25 Id.  
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A large percentage of these problems relate to the minimal staffing of these 
private facilities. Many private correctional institutions routinely fail to provide 
enough officers to prevent violence. 26  In addition, the correction officers are 
frequently inexperienced, unable to maintain the tight control and discipline needed 
to run a correctional facility safely.27 Equally dangerous, private prison guards often 
receive minimal job training. As a result, private prison guards have high rates of 
exploiting and assaulting inmates under their supervision.28 The business model of 
these for-profit prisons requires that they spend as little as possible on officer pay 
and training,29 even if the result is inmate violence, injury or death. 
Even within the world of privatized corrections, CCA is notorious for poorly 
staffing its prisons. In 1997, CCA staffed a federal prison in Ohio with officers who 
had minimal corrections experience and then relocated 1,700 high-level security 
prisoners from Washington, D.C. to reside there.30 Within the first fourteen months, 
the facility experienced thirteen stabbings, two murders, and six escapes. 31  In 
desperation, local officials sued CCA in federal court for failing to abide by its own 
standards, and CCA was ultimately ordered to remove 113 of the maximum-security 
prisoners from the facility.32  
CCA is currently under criminal investigation by the FBI for falsifying 4,800 
hours of guard posts required under an Idaho contract.33 CCA collected state funds 
for guards who were never assigned to work. The Idaho facility amassed four times 
the number of prisoner-on-prisoner assaults than the state’s seven other prisons 
combined, a result of the badly inadequate staffing. 34  In addition, the facility, 
nicknamed “the Gladiator School” due to its multiple intra-inmate fights, suffered 
                                                   
26 See Pat Beall, “Parade of Horribles” in Private Prisons, PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 
3, 2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/parade-of-horribles-in-private-
prisonscost-cutting/nbdpx/ [https://perma.cc/3C9V-SWMG]. Indeed, recently CCA 
admitted that it had lied about understaffing a particularly violent Idaho prison. Id.  
27 See id.  
28 See id.  
29 See id.  
30 Mike Brickner, Correction Corporation of America’s Loss Is Ohio’s Gain, ACLU 
(Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/corrections-corporation-americas-loss-
ohios-gain [https://perma.cc/A3VP-PZ6V]. 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Who Is CCA?, ACLU TENN., http://www.aclu-tn.org/who-is-cca/ [https://perma.cc 
/94FF-JHLA] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). An independent auditor found that CCA failed to 
fill at least 26,000 hours of required posts in 2012 alone, for an average of 500 hours per 
week of missing security staff. Id.  
34 Id.  
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epidemic—and continuing—violence. 35  CCA was ultimately removed from 
management, but not until after many inmates were seriously injured.36  
The few officers provided by these private prison companies are trained to step 
back and not get involved. CCA advises its prison guard trainees to not break up an 
inmate fight, or even call for backup. Instead, guards are instructed to ask the 
prisoners to stop fighting, and if they refuse, to just walk away.37 At some CCA 
prisons, sometimes there are only two officers per 800 inmates at mealtimes, a 
seriously inadequate ratio.38 Inside the general population ward, where the prisoners 
spend most of their time, there is likewise often only one CCA guard per 176 
inmates.39 On the segregated solitary confinement wards, CCA guards routinely fail 
to check on the prisoners every thirty minutes, as they are required to do,40 creating 
an unsafe environment for at-risk inmates. Guard towers surrounding the CCA 
correctional facilities are frequently unmanned, permitting inmate escapes.41 
The GEO Group has been equally negligent in its running of private prisons. In 
2012, the U.S. Department of Justice found that a Mississippi juvenile facility run 
by the GEO Group violated the constitutional rights of the youth detained there.42 
The young men incarcerated in the prison were “sexually preyed upon by the staff 
and all too frequently suffered grievous harm, including death.”43 Moreover, the 
GEO Group provided virtually no care or oversight for their young charges, 
including deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct with youth by correction 
officers; excessive use of force by prison guards on youth; failure to protect the 
inmates from youth-on-youth violence; deliberate indifference to the youth at risk 
of self-injurious and suicidal behaviors; and ignoring inmates’ medical needs.44  
This mismanagement is sadly typical for GEO Group-run facilities. In 2013, 
inmates at East Mississippi Correctional Facility filed suit alleging “barbaric and 
                                                   
35 Pat Beall, Judge: Prison Firm Lied About Staffing, PALM BEACH POST (NOV. 3, 
2013), http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/judge-prison-firm-lied-about-staffing 
/nbfRx/ [https://perma.cc/5QHM-5W9F]. 
36  Kelly v. Wengler, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/kelly-v-wengler 
[https://perma.cc/5FWU-ZR68] (last updated May 23, 2016). 
37 See Bauer, supra note 5, at Chapter 1.  
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. at Chapter 2. 
42 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice 
Releases Investigative Findings on the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility in 
Mississippi (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-
investigative-findings-walnut-grove-youth-correctional-facility [https://perma.cc/LU2Q-
62Q9]. 
43 Id.  
44 Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. to Phil Bryant, 
Governor of the State of Miss. 5, 15, 21 (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/09/walnutgrovefl.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WJ-XYC9]. 
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horrific conditions” at the GEO Group-run prison.45 An ACLU investigation found 
that these prisoners were underfed, housed in filthy conditions, and held in rat-
infested cells lacking working toilets or lights.46 Although government-run prisons 
are hardly plush, the conditions in many privately-run facilities frequently go below 
even the minimum standards. 
Privatized federal prisons suffer similarly endemic problems. A recent Office 
of the Inspector General report revealed that private federal prisons—managed by 
CCA, the GEO Group, and Management & Training Corporation47—incurred more 
safety and security incidents per capita than comparable public federal prisons, 
including higher rates of assaults, extensive property damage, bodily injury, death 
of a correctional officer, and improperly segregating new inmates in twenty-four-
hour lockdown.48  These results are meaningful, given that federal prisons have 
considerably more resources and much lower levels of overcrowding than state and 
local prisons. Thus, even in the best possible incarceration scenario, private prison 
operators incurred a variety of negative and dangerous incidents.  
In light of these findings, on August 18, 2016, the Obama Justice Department 
decided to stop using private prison companies to run federal prisons.49 As the 
Deputy Attorney General noted: “[Private prisons] simply do not provide the same 
level of correctional services, programs, and resources; they do not save 
substantially on costs; and as noted in a recent report by the Department’s Office of 
Inspector General, they do not maintain the same level of safety and security.”50 
Given the Trump Justice Department’s recent rescission of the order, 
however,51 privately-run federal prisons appear likely to remain. The Bureau of 
Prisons currently has twelve private prison contracts, which house approximately 
21,000 inmates.52 Combined with the number of offenders held by private state 
prisons, a significant amount of those people incarcerated in this country are under 
the supervision of the private sector. 
 
                                                   
45 Complaint at 1, Dockery v. Epps, No. 3:13-cv-326 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2013), 2013 
WL 2361045. 
46 Id. at 2–4.  
47 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
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B.  Private Alternative Corrections Instead of Traditional Incarceration 
 
For-profit prison companies are moving aggressively into the world of alternate 
corrections, which includes private jails, halfway houses, probation services, and 
rehabilitation centers. The number of offenders subject to private punishment 
multiplies when the count is expanded outside of prison walls. The private 
companies running alternative corrections—often the very same for-profit 
companies that run the private prisons—have precisely the same profit-based 
motivation, and tend to use the same business models.53 
Largely due to concern over sentencing reform, investors and private prison 
companies have started investing in alternative correction services, such as private 
halfway houses, electronic monitoring, private probation, “civil commitment” 
centers for sex offenders, and for-profit residential treatment facilities. 54  These 
“alternatives” to incarceration can be very profitable, especially if they are run 
similarly to privately-owned prisons.  
 
1.  Private Probation and Post-Release Supervision 
 
Private probation companies have greatly expanded in recent years. As of 2016, 
over 1,000 courts, most in the South but including Michigan and Washington State, 
have transferred the supervising and fee-collection from misdemeanor offenders to 
private probation companies.55 These private companies often advertise themselves 
to impoverished state and local governments as an inexpensive way to punish low-
level offenders while keeping them out of costly jails.56  
These probation companies, however, frequently end up indebting 
probationers, not rehabilitating them.57  Probation privatizers make money from 
imposing numerous fees on probationers, fees that multiply with penalties and 
interest if the offender cannot pay.58 And when offenders cannot pay, arrest and 
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imprisonment often follows, sometimes based on warrants drafted by probation 
companies and issued by the courts.59 
In addition to debt collection, many private probation companies also offer 
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and even behavioral-therapy courses,60 all at 
little to no cost to local governments and courts.61 In truth, private probation services 
transfer the financial burden of probation directly onto offenders, all while taking 
their monetary cut. The result is that most offenders, who tend to be impoverished, 
spend the rest of their lives trying to pay off their criminal justice debt.62 Local 
governments that use private probation services essentially turn courts into debt-
collection machines, with the profits going to the private companies. The objective 
no longer focuses on best interest of either the defendant or society.63 
All courts struggle to collect criminal justice debt from offenders, whether they 
utilize the services of private probation companies or not. Private probation fees, 
however, are often substantially greater than what states charge for equivalent 
services, as many states charge nothing at all.64 These private supervision fees can 
increase criminal justice debt significantly, and lead to more incarceration in the 
long run.65 
Furthermore, the competition among private probation companies for 
profitable, exclusive contracts with local courts can engender corruption among both 
court and company officials.66 For example, ten years of private probation in Idaho 
was shut down after allegations of profiteering and illegal fees. 67  Likewise, in 
Tennessee, private probation companies have been so rapacious in their eagerness 
to extract fees from offenders that some of them are afraid to leave the house.68 One 
major private probation company, Judicial Correction Services, has been repeatedly 
sued in Alabama and Mississippi for racketeering and extortion, among other 
charges.69 In the world of private probation, both transparency and oversight are 
extremely rare.70 
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Another problem with privatized probation companies is the trend of “net-
widening”: placing more people into the criminal justice system, and keeping them 
there longer, 71  even if they’re not behind bars, for purposes of profit. Thus, 
“[i]nstead of moving [rehabilitated offenders] into the community, with some form 
of accountability,” 72  these companies simply continue to have them wear the 
electronic monitoring hardware, thereby stretching out the payment plans and the 
profits. Allowing probation to be run for profit often means that probationary 
decision-making shifts from ostensibly neutral courts to for-profit companies, ones 
that use probation not only as a tool to extract fees from offenders,73 but also to 
extend offenders’ time under supervision, ultimately increasing profits.  
 
2.  Private Halfway Houses and Re-Entry Programs 
 
The private corrections industry has also begun investing in extra-carceral 
services. In 2013, for example, CCA purchased Correctional Alternatives, which 
specializes in prisoner re-entry programs, like work furloughs and home 
confinement.74 Likewise, the GEO Group now owns a variety of “community re-
entry services” and treatment programs, having purchased the country’s largest 
electronic-monitoring firm, BI Incorporated, in 2011.75 This expansion may well be 
a concern if these programs are run similarly to the private prisons, jails, and 
probation services, as it is unlikely the focus will be on rehabilitation.  
A cautionary tale is provided by New Jersey’s experience with Community 
Education Centers (“CEC”), a privately run, for-profit rehabilitation company. In 
the 1990s, New Jersey began outsourcing its prisoner re-entry and halfway houses 
to CEC, resulting in client neglect, abuse, and outright chaos.76  Roughly forty 
percent of all New Jersey state prisoners enter a halfway house after prison, and 
Community Education Centers controlled most of those. 77  Conditions at these 
private halfway houses were shocking, far worse than those run by the state. In one 
year alone, 185 offenders escaped from the houses, 78  many of them violent 
offenders, and life within the centers was dangerous and unregulated. Problems with 
CEC’s halfway houses have not been limited to New Jersey; in 2011, an Indiana 
inmate died due to untreated pregnancy complications, and Colorado inmates 
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described assaults, gang violence and rampant drug use.79 Despite these problems, 
CEC was acquired by the  GEO Group, which now provides both residential and 
non-residential re-entry programs.80    
Transitional and halfway houses have proved a profitable undertaking for 
private prison companies. The GEO Group, for example, took over the Southeast 
Texas Transitional Center in October 2010, and during its first two years, six people 
escaped from a halfway house for high-risk sex offenders.81 
On the whole, private halfway houses run by large for-profit companies have a 
poor track record, far worse than non-profit halfway houses and rehabilitation 
centers. Avalon Correctional Services, one of the country’s largest for-profit 
halfway house companies, is notorious for drug use, sales, and overdoses in its 
residences, as well as guards staging fights where inmates were forced to beat each 
other bloody.82 Allegations were made that the beatings had an economic motive; in 
lieu of punishing residents by sending them back to prison (which would cost Avalon 
money from lost clients), facility administrators relied on “informal discipline” to 
ensure that offenders remained at the halfway house.83 In addition, Avalon has been 
sued by several female inmates alleging that they suffered sexual abuse during their 
work-release program, where administrators routinely ignored their complaints.84  
It seems that any profit motive in the recovery industry leads to trouble. For 
example, in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, privately-run “sober houses” were discovered 
to have provided drugs to the residents, paid bribes to get a steady stream of well-
insured patients, committed insurance fraud, condoned sexual abuse, and even taken 
residents’ phones and car keys, thus making it impossible for them to leave.85 The 
almost complete lack of regulation and vulnerable natures of the addicts trying to 
rehabilitate in these houses made the residents particularly easy to exploit, 86  a 
common theme in corrections privatization.  
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3.  Private Jails 
 
Jails have also not been immune to the privatization spree. Although there are 
bad conditions in many local jails, the worst conditions have arisen from privately-
run facilities. One such example is the Jack Harwell Detention Center in Waco, 
Texas, run by LaSalle. Lawsuits filed against the facility have claimed that 
employees there routinely refused mental-health treatment, essential medications 
and medical care to detainees, and falsified documents to cover up their failure to 
perform visual checks on at-risk people.87 There is a separate suit claiming the jail 
ignored multiple sexual assaults on a female detainee by a corrections officer.88 
Multiple sources have described the Harwell Detention Center as an out-of-control 
institution rife with smuggling, extortion and drug abuse.89 
Likewise, the GEO Group-owned CEC has had continual problems with its 
privatized short-term facilities. In the past two years, CEC has been under scrutiny 
for a number of health and safety issues, and is currently facing a wrongful death 
suit from a Dallas family that alleges their family member was given improper 
medical care while in CEC custody, leading to his death.90  
CEC is also under investigation for the 2015 deaths of two prisoners in a single 
week at a Houston, Texas jail.91 The Texas Commission on Jail Standards found 
multiple problems at the facility, including infrequent inmate observations, 
incomplete suicide prevention screening, and improper distribution of medication.92 
This privately-run jail has repeatedly failed Texas correctional standards, including 
failing to complete mental disability/suicide screening forms, not properly 
distributing medicine, no access to drinking water, cells with broken locking 
mechanisms, and facilities with broken toilets and showers. 93  These types of 
violations, ranging from minor to severe, are a constant feature for privately run 
jails, marking a definite worsening of conditions from government-run jails. 
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4.  Privatized Juvenile Corrections 
 
Similar concerns have arisen with the privatization of juvenile correctional 
facilities. Over 40,000 children are currently incarcerated in privately operated 
juvenile facilities.94 This is approximately forty percent of the nation’s juvenile 
offenders incarcerated in private facilities, a figure that has grown roughly thirty-
three percent in the past fifteen years.95 Although some of these private juvenile 
correction centers are not-for-profit operations, a large number of them are for-
profit.96 The end result makes money off the backs of young offenders.  
Privatized youth correction facilities routinely cut costs by shrinking staffing, 
often with dangerous results. For example, at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional 
Facility, a GEO Group-run Mississippi private prison, there was only one 
correctional officer employed for every 120 juvenile prisoners. 97  High rates of 
violence resulted, as there were too few staff to properly supervise the children, with 
twenty-seven assaults per one hundred offenders in 2013.98 As was detailed in a 
Department of Justice report, minimal staffing, bad management, and lax oversight 
turned the youth detention center into an armed camp, where “female employees had 
sex with [juvenile] inmates, pitted them against each other, gave them weapons and 
joined their gangs.”99  
Despite these serious problems, states like Florida have outsourced all their 
juvenile corrections to private, for-profit companies.100  The children and young 
adults incarcerated in Youth Services International (“YSI”) prisons, jails, and 
halfway houses across the country have undergone beatings, neglect, sexual abuse, 
and unsanitary food over the past two decades.101 YSI would routinely hold the 
children past their release dates in order to make more money.102 Since there was no 
true scrutiny of privatized juvenile facilities, the company simply fabricated the 
necessary paperwork for its annual state quality assurance evaluations, time and time 
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again.103 This glossing over of problems for the state audit was routinely ignored, 
since many Florida state employees wound up going to work for the same private 
contractors they regulated.104 
Like many private corrections companies, YSI has managed to keep operating 
over the years by careful grooming of state political connections at the highest levels, 
and cleverly gaming the private contracting system by pulling out of state contracts 
whenever an investigation looked likely.105 These practices have been going on for 
over twenty years—whenever one of YSI’s facilities was about to be shut down, the 
company would withdraw from the state contract before any damaging reports were 
filed, and then another facility, with a new name, would simply take its place.106 
As in all aspects of criminal justice, when the profit motive enters the realm of 
juvenile corrections, it is hard to eradicate. In the 2009 “Kids for Cash” scandal, for 
example, two Pennsylvania judges and two privatized juvenile corrections owners 
were charged with accepting and giving bribes in exchange for sending children to 
various forms of privatized punishment, including private boot camp, boarding 
school, wilderness camp, and juvenile detention facilities.107 These children were 
often accused of nothing more than a misdemeanor, and appeared in court without 
lawyers.108 Over a million dollars in bribes were paid.109 Critically, “Kids for Cash” 
began when one of the judges shut down the state juvenile detention centers in favor 
of a private, for-profit company facility.110 Once the sneaking tendrils of profit-
making have taken root, they are very hard to eradicate, even when the profits come 
at the expense of children’s health, safety, and rights.  
 
C.  Outsourcing Essential Prison Services 
 
Although some outsourcing may be necessary in today’s complex corrections 
environment, the use of external, for-profit providers for needs as varied as health 
care, food, phone services, and visitation has significantly decreased the quality of 
life for inmates, while increasing the money that goes to these private companies. 
The increased costs to inmate well-being, health, and safety, as well as the numerous 
lawsuits that have arisen from the substandard health care provided, illustrate how 
costly these private providers can be. 
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1.  Privatized Prison Health Care 
 
One major expansion of privatized correction services has been in inmate 
health care.111 Many states have outsourced their prison healthcare, attempting to cut 
costs in tight times.112 The federal system has increased its healthcare outsourcing 
as well; federal spending on privatized inmate healthcare increased by twenty-four 
percent—to $327 million—between 2010 and 2014.113 In 2014, sixty-nine prisons 
were surveyed and all of them paid much more for medical services than the 
Medicare rates, with some prisons spending as much as 385% more for private 
healthcare.114 
Despite its expense, outsourcing prison healthcare has not been beneficial for 
medically fragile inmates, who have routinely been denied medical care and accused 
of faking their health problems.115 Some of this neglect has led directly to prisoner 
deaths. In 2005, for example, the lackadaisical and neglectful health care provision 
from Prison Health Services led to two deaths in New York state prisons.116 One 
death was caused by a jail medical director cutting off all but a few of an inmate’s 
thirty-two daily pills, needed to control Parkinson tremors, with the nurses ignoring 
the inmate’s subsequent pleas.117 Ten days later, when the man died, the prison 
officers doctored the records to cover up the abuse and neglect.118 Two months later, 
another inmate’s chest pains were ignored and treated only with Ben-Gay and 
arthritis medicine.119 Ten days later, she died of a heart attack at age thirty-five.120 
Prison Health Services, the for-profit corporation overseeing these New York 
prison health services, obtained numerous corrections contracts by claiming that it 
could provide medical care, recruit doctors, and battle lawsuits, all at a cost lower 
than what the state was currently paying.121 In the end, however, the costs were far 
higher than predicted. Prison Health Services provided substandard care for inmates 
by following a deadly blueprint: “medical staffs trimmed to the bone, doctors 
underqualified or out of reach, nurses doing tasks beyond their training, prescription 
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drugs withheld, patient records unread and employee misconduct unpunished.”122 
Despite numerous deaths, minimal service, and outright neglect, however, along 
with millions of dollars in lawsuits, Prison Health Services continues to provide 
medical care to jails and prisons throughout the United States.123 
Likewise, Correctional Medical Services (“CMS”) has provided similarly 
neglectful care for inmates over the years, due in large part to its role as “the nation’s 
cheapest provider, a perfect convergence of big business and low budgets.”124 CMS 
has routinely rejected hepatitis screening and treatment for inmates, despite the 
contagious and deadly nature of the disease. 125  This casual attitude towards 
contagious disease126  is not only dangerous for inmates, but also threatens the 
general health of the public in the long run. 
California prisons have also suffered from low-quality private health care. 
Between 2004 and 2014, approximately 200 inmates died under the “care” of 
California Forensic Medical Group (“CFMG”), a private prison healthcare 
company.127 Excluding homicide, this works out at a death rate of roughly 1.7 per 
1,000 inmates at CFMG facilities, compared with 1.5 in other facilities.128 
Overall, approximately forty percent of all prison health care is farmed out to 
for-profit providers.129 The problem with such medical provision is two-fold. First, 
as detailed above, the quality of care provided is dangerously bad. In addition, 
however, there is simply no transparency or accountability provided by these private 
correctional medical providers.130 As journalist Wil Hylton observed: 
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[P]rivate companies . . . feel no responsibility, and have no legal 
obligation, to account to the public for what goes on inside their 
facilities. . . . [They] choose[] not to provide any accounting of how that 
money is spent or even how much of it is spent—and how much unspent, 
to be pocketed as profit.131 
 
The combination of ruthless cost cutting, negligent medical care, and lack of 
transparency has created a space where profit overtakes minimal prisoner health 
requirements, resulting in malpractice, mistreatment, and death. As one district court 
monitor in Georgia described, the “care” provided by these companies created a 
“medical gulag.”132 
Despite all of these problems with Correctional Medical Services and Prison 
Health Services, however, in 2011, Valitas Health Services (the parent company of 
Correctional Medical Services) acquired Prison Health Services, creating a 
correctional health care goliath.133 Renamed Corizon, the company now serves more 
than 400 facilities.134 Currently the largest correctional health care provider, Corizon 
earned $1.4 billion in 2014, providing services for around 345,000 inmates in 
twenty-seven states. 135  
Like its predecessors, Corizon has repeatedly provided extremely substandard 
health care for inmates. Across the country, most recently in Indiana, Florida, and 
New York, advocates and officials have accused Corizon of cutting corners to save 
money, resulting in inadequate care.136 Allegations have been repeatedly raised, with 
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certain medications or send offenders for specialized testing, diagnoses, or 
treatment.137 Corizon recently expanded its range of prison services, now including 
medical, mental health, rehab, dental, and vision,138 despite its often borderline-
negligent health services.139  
Overall, private prison healthcare providers, whether large or small, do a poor 
job of providing medical services to inmates. As two economists from the University 
of California, Santa Barbara found in a 2007 study, even though states obtained 
lower costs with outsourced prison healthcare, using these companies led to higher 
inmate mortality rates.140 Granted, state-provided prison health care is no panacea.141 
The evidence seems to show, however, that outsourcing health services to for-profit 
companies results in even worse care, with only questionable savings.142  Even 
within the world of prison privatization, the private prison health care industry’s 
metastatic growth and ferocious hunger for profit raises a note of extreme caution.143 
The health care provided in private correctional facilities is minimal. Any time 
an inmate is taken to a hospital, the private prison company must pay for her stay, 
which cuts into profit.144 In addition, the prison must send two guards to watch over 
the inmate while she is in the hospital, which also adds up.145 As repeated lawsuits 
have shown, CCA and other prison privatizers shirk providing necessary medical 
attention in even the most critical of times.146 Numerous experiences of outright 
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denial of care to ailing inmates, criminal neglect, and insufficient medical protocols 
when care is provided have led to repeated cases of injury and death.147  
Mental health care in private prisons fares no better. One CCA prison in 
Louisiana, incarcerating more than 1,500 inmates, had no full-time psychiatrists and 
only one full-time social worker.148 This was in contrast to the publicly run prisons 
in Louisiana—one of the most poorly funded public prison systems in the country—
which have at least three full-time mental health counselors.149  
In sum, the indifference to suffering and the rampant cost-cutting found in 
privatized prison health care makes it unsustainable and unsupportable. Even 
compared to the low standard of medical care provided in America’s government-
run prisons, private prison healthcare has been a failure.  
 
2.  Private Prison Transport 
 
The privatization of interstate prisoner transport has resulted in the abuse and 
death of both indicted and convicted offenders. Over the past sixteen years, as 
private, for-profit companies have taken over prisoner transportation, four offenders 
have died, fourteen have alleged abuse, both physical and sexual, and over fifty have 
escaped.150 In addition, the conditions in these private transport vans are routinely 
inhumane, causing unnecessary suffering and punishment. Prisoners routinely pass 
out from heat-stroke, vomit, panic, get dehydrated, urinate and defecate on 
themselves, and have withdrawals from their medications during the long journeys 
from one correctional facility to another.151 
Prisoner Transportation Services of America (“PTS”), the country’s largest for-
profit extradition company, routinely transports suspects and offenders in 
lamentable conditions.152 A typical PTS transport van crams roughly fifteen people, 
male and female, into seats inside a backseat cage, each handcuffed and shackled at 
the waist and ankles.153 There is usually little to no air-conditioning, and no way to 
lie down to sleep during the long, rough trips around the country as the vans pick up  
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detainees for transport.154 Although the driving is erratic and often dangerous, there 
are no seatbelts for the detainees.155 Sometimes there is abuse from the guards, both 
physical and sexual.156  
Female prisoners face a particular risk of sexual assault by guards during 
transport.157 Since 2000, at least fourteen women have filed civil or criminal lawsuits 
against private transportation companies alleging they were sexually assaulted while 
being transported from one correction facility to another.158 
The privatization of prisoner transport tells a familiar story of private, for-profit 
punishment, one of “a pattern of prisoner abuse and neglect in an industry that 
operates with almost no oversight.”159 Guards have little to no training, and often 
fail to recognize, or simply ignore, signs of serious illness.160 The cross-country trips 
to pick up various prisoners can take weeks to complete. In addition, the pressure to 
drive quickly and cut corners to make a profit has resulted in detainees being locked 
inside the vans for days with minimal food and water, infrequent bathroom stops, 
and no facilities in the van.161  Furthermore, there is a wide range of different 
detainees transported in the vans, and often suspects are mixed with violent 
offenders.162 “Unruly” prisoners are locked in a segregation cage.163 In part, these 
conditions have been allowed to continue because crossing so many state lines can 
make jurisdiction murky. Federal regulators have shown little interest in stemming 
such abuses, and the correction facilities that hire such private transport often try to 
reject any accountability for prisoners not under their direct custody.164  
Despite all these problems, the significant price differential between 
government transport and private transport makes the lure of using private 
transportation quite substantial.165 In 2016, twenty-six out of fifty states used private, 
for-profit prisoner transport companies to extradite offenders from one correctional 
facility to another.166 The private transport companies are also used by variety of 
cities and municipalities as well. 167  All of this takes place with virtually no 
governmental oversight.168 In the case of private prisoner transport, any savings 
made are at the expense of the comfort, safety, human dignity, and sometimes, the 
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lives of those transported. Efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and ease of arrangement 
should not be traded off for basic human rights. 
 
3.  Privatized Prisoner Banking 
 
Current prisoner banking practices primarily benefit private corrections 
banking companies. For example, JPay Inc. (“JPay”), 169  a private, for-profit 
company that oversees inmates’ bank accounts, has charged fees as high as forty-
five percent to place money in an account. These inmate accounts are vital when 
facing long periods of incarceration;170 the vast majority of funds paying for basic 
needs like toothpaste, visits to the doctor, winter clothes, toilet paper, electricity, and 
even room and board.171  For approximately 400,000 inmates, there is no other 
deposit option but this one. The choice is to pay the fees or go without.172 Although 
companies like JPay claim to streamline the provision of money from families to 
inmates, they have actually replaced the simplicity of sending money orders with a 
system which charges high user fees per transaction to deposit money via a debit 
card.173  
But the disturbing aspect of JPay, its competitor Touchpay,174 and its prison 
banking confederates is not just limited to their usurious user fees. As the Center for 
Public Interest has noted, “[b]y erecting a virtual tollbooth at the prison gate, JPay 
has become a critical financial conduit for an opaque constellation of vendors that 
profit from millions of poor families with incarcerated loved ones.”175  In other 
words, private prison banking controls the provision of family funds to incarcerated 
offenders, making it far easier for all sorts of private prison services to take their 
cut.176  
Correction facilities benefit from privatized banking as well. Besides 
simplifying the transfer of funds, for every payment sent to a prisoner (usually at 
least one transfer per prisoner per month) the company remits between $.50 and 
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$2.50 back to the facility.177 Little of this remission, however, goes to prisoner 
services.178 The remainder of the profit goes back to the prison banking company—
for JPay, to the tune of $50 million in yearly revenue.179 
Federal prisoners are equally captive to private banking fees. The Treasury 
Department granted private companies such as Bank of America and JPMorgan 
extremely lucrative no-bid contracts to service federal prison banking.180  Since 
2000, Bank of America has had a monopoly on federal prisoner banking, making 
over $76.3 million for its oversight of the program.181 Similar to the state prisoner 
banking system, Bank of America’s system allows it to subcontract with other for-
profit, subcontracted prison vendors, placing it as the node of prison services 
conveniently procured outside any government bidding process.182 
When federal prisoners are released, JPMorgan then issues high-fee debit cards 
to return to them the remaining monies from their own prison accounts, which 
include prison wages and money sent from family members. 183  For example, 
JPMorgan debit cards impose a $2 fee for an ATM withdrawal, and $1.50 for leaving 
an account inactive for three months—fees that can easily eat up a released 
offender’s remaining funds.184 
 
4.  Privatized Phone and Visitation Services 
 
The high calling rates and numerous fees charged by private correctional phone 
companies not only make money off the backs of a captive population, but also 
reduce the contact and social bonds between prisoners and their home communities. 
Prison administrators, both public and private, routinely select prison phone 
companies based on the amount of commission offered to them. This commission is 
derived from the very expensive phone rates paid by prisoners and their families.185 
Currently, prison phone companies can charge eleven cents a minute to prison 
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inmates, and fourteen to twenty-two cents a minute to jail inmates.186 This is an 
improvement on the almost $1 per minute rate that was charged until 2015, when 
the FCC capped the vast majority of prison phone and limited the amount of add-on 
fees. These fees were a major source of revenue for prison phone companies.187  
Such deals are money-makers for correctional administrators. In Los Angeles 
County, for example, these commissions have a contractual guarantee of $15 million 
a year. 188  The high rates end up limiting most inmate phone calls to the bare 
minimum, given the poverty level of most families of incarcerated offenders. 
Expensive phone calls can cause prisoners to communicate less frequently with their 
families and friends in the outside world, which ultimately increases the recidivism 
rate.189 
In addition, prison telephone providers have helped pass legislation to ban 
prisoners from possessing cell phones, despite the fact that most inmates only use 
their cell phones to contact their families. 190  Securus, Global Tel*Link, and 
CenturyLink, which control over eighty percent of prison phone business 
nationwide, have spent millions of dollars on lobbying and political contributions.191 
In 2010, Congress passed the Cell Phone Contraband Act, 192  which made the 
possession of a cell phone or wireless device in a federal prison a felony punishable 
by a fine and up to one additional year of incarceration. Several states have also 
passed laws strictly punishing an inmate’s possession of a cell phone, including 
Maryland, Arizona, and Alabama.193 These laws received strong support from the 
three leading prison phone companies.194 Prisoners are thus left reliant on private 
telephony and absurdly expensive long-distance phone rates to keep in touch with 
their outside support systems.  
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Finally, the growth of video visitation threatens to eliminate some in-person 
prison visitation, once again increasing social and monetary costs for prisoners and 
their families.195 Some video call companies require a ban on in-person visitation 
before they will sign a contract with a correction facility.196 For example, until May 
2015, Securus Technology’s standard contract required the jail or prison to eliminate 
in-person visits.197  
A startling seventy-four percent of county jails with video visitation have ended 
in-person visits, which, for impoverished families who do not have access to this 
kind of technology, can eliminate contact entirely.198 At last count, approximately 
600 prisons in forty-six states have some version of a video visitation system, and 
every year, more and more of those correctional facilities eliminate in-person 
visitation entirely.199 Given the current demographics of inmates—overwhelmingly 
poor, largely minority, many non-English speakers—having video visitation entirely 
replace regular visitation threatens to cut off communication between prisoners and 
their families, because the costs are so exorbitant.200 
These video visitation systems are popular with correctional facilities because 
the facility saves money in outsourcing visitation.201 Video visitation requires fewer 
full-time prison staff members to escort the prisoner to a video terminal.202 Often 
there are large sums to be paid directly to the Sheriff’s Department, local 
government, or correctional facility.203  
Further, these often expensive, bug-ridden video calls can actually increase 
violence and discipline issues in correction facilities. 204  Early studies of the 
implementation of video visiting have shown that incidences of inmate-on-inmate 
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violence, disciplinary infractions and possession of contraband tend to rise after 
correctional facilities eliminate in-person visitation in favor of video visitation.205 
For example, disciplinary cases for contraband possession in Travis County, Texas 
increased fifty-four percent after the county switched to video-only visitation.206  
Thus, far from providing a better experience for the prisoner, privatization of 
correctional facilities, whether in ways large or small, does them no favors. As 
always, the companies themselves are the primary group benefiting from the work 
of for-profit prisons and the outsourcing of prison services. 
 
5.  Privatized Prison Food Services 
 
Another area of rampant correctional privatization is prisoner meal 
provision. 207  Privatized prison food services have managed costs by carefully 
measuring meal portions and, in some cases, reducing meals to only twice daily.208 
The savings promised by these prison food providers have been hard to resist for 
many counties across the nation, despite the inmate hunger that these services often 
create.209 
Other problems with outsourcing prison meals include rotten or spoiled foods. 
In 2014, Aramark Food Services was terminated from servicing Michigan prisons 
due to, among other issues: failing to appropriately feed inmates; the use of 
unauthorized substitutions or not preparing enough meals; and maggots and rodents 
in and near inmate food sources.210 Aramark was also alleged to have failed to handle 
food safely, failed to hire and train enough people to keep food from spoiling, and 
failed to use food equipment properly.211 Similar issues occurred with Aramark Food 
in prisons in Ohio212 and Mississippi,213 as well as in jails in New Jersey.214 This 
kind of negligence, extreme parsimony, and potentially deliberate indifference to 
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proper food preparation and staffing is a consistent hallmark of outsourcing jail and 
prison functions to the for-profit world. 
One common theme of this explosion of privatization is that moving from 
public to private provision of corrections and services has been primarily beneficial 
to the private corrections companies themselves. Part II discusses some of the 
secondary effects of modern privatization on offenders, their families, and their 
communities. 
 
II.  THE TRUTH OF PRIVATIZED CORRECTIONS: DAMAGED FAMILIES,  
HIGHER COSTS 
 
The privatization of correctional facilities and their services has had strong 
negative effects on offender rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. 
Although government correctional facilities often do a poor job in rehabilitating and 
reintegrating inmates, private correctional services perform notably worse. The 
failures of the private correctional system include higher rates of recidivism, more 
damage to families and communities, and higher monetary costs in general. 
 
A.  Higher Rates of Recidivism 
 
Academic research has shown that offenders incarcerated in prisons and jails 
operated by for-profit companies have higher rates of recidivism than similarly 
situated offenders who are incarcerated in publicly managed prisons and jails.215 
This is largely due to their business models, which are dependent on continued 
incarceration. Such higher levels of recidivism can be attributed to two primary 
causes: higher rates of violence in private facilities, and greater difficulty for visiting 
families due to out-of-state incarceration. 
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1.  Greater Violence 
 
Private prisons are, statistically, more violent than public prisons.216 This is due 
in part to the minimalist staffing policies in private prisons, which reduces operating 
costs and increases profits.217 In Texas and Florida, where approximately a third of 
all inmates reside in privately held prisons, employee turnover rates were fifty to 
more than one hundred percent higher in private prisons than in public ones.218 
Likewise, in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Idaho, company-run prisons have had 
higher assault rates than public ones. 219  In general, prisoners who experience 
violence while incarcerated are more likely to recidivate than prisoners who do 
not.220   
Moreover, guard pay is lower in private prisons than in public ones. According 
to the U.S. Labor Department, median annual pay in company-run facilities was 
$30,460 in 2010, twenty-one percent less than for correctional officers employed by 
states.221 Lower pay means lower morale for correctional officers, which often leads 
to greater apathy, burnout, and worse conditions overall. 
 
2.  Out of State Incarceration 
 
To fill beds in the prisons they own, private prison companies routinely 
incarcerate prisoners in locations far away from their homes, often in other states.222 
As a result, prisoners often lose contact with their families and communities, making 
them more likely to recidivate than those who keep in closer connection.223 As a 
rule, the more visits an offender receives during her incarceration, the less likely she 
is to reoffend when she is released.224  
These visits from family and friends provide a critical way to establish, 
maintain, and enhance an inmate’s social support networks. Strengthening an 
inmate’s social bonds is important not only because it can help prevent the 
assumption of a criminal identity, but also because, as discussed below, most 
released prisoners rely on family and friends for necessities such as employment, 
financial support, and housing.225 
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B.  Costs to Prisoners’ Families 
 
Whether large or small, private corrections companies incarcerate thousands of 
prisoners, often extremely far away from their friends and family. Although states 
often house convicted offenders in correctional facilities far away from major 
population centers, several states have begun incarcerating offenders in private 
prisons located in different states entirely. Alaska,226 Arkansas, California, Hawaii, 
Vermont, and Wyoming,227 along with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, all 
ship substantial prisoners to private prisons located out of state, primarily due to 
prison overcrowding.228 Hawaii ships a full quarter of its convicted offenders out of 
state—so many that CCA has dedicated a special prison just for Hawaiians in 
Arizona.229 Washington State and North Dakota look like they will soon follow these 
states’ lead.230 
This out-of-state incarceration often severely curtails family visits, as traveling 
over such great distances to see convicted family members costs both time and 
money. 231  Since most prisoners and their families are disproportionately low-
income, both the logistical and financial challenges are often insurmountable.232 The 
distance also takes its toll on children, who rarely get to see their incarcerated 
parents, sufficing with infrequent phone calls or letters.233 This makes reintegration 
more difficult for returning offenders, who often have lost touch with family 
members and children during the long absence. 
Moreover, housing prisoners so far out of state makes it very difficult for the 
state to oversee operations. Private prison companies are notorious for contract 
violations and safety and security problems, but there is much less a state agency 
can do from thousands of miles away.234 It can be difficult to get accurate health and 
safety information from out-of-state doctors and coroners.235 
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In addition, long distances complicate a prisoner’s ability to keep up with court 
dates, appeals, and filing deadlines, which can be short in duration and extremely 
complex. California’s Prison Law Office has specifically warned that it can be 
“difficult for out-of-state prisoners to get access to forms and information needed to 
file legal cases in the California courts.”236  
Likewise, it is more difficult for a prisoner’s home state parole agency to track 
a prisoner’s progress, thus potentially incarcerating inmates for longer than 
necessary due to incomplete information concerning rehabilitation.237 In a similar 
vein, out-of-state inmates may have different or additional rights than in-state 
inmates, and those rights can be hard to keep track of and preserve when incarcerated 
in a distant, for-profit prison.238  
Finally, re-entering society can be particularly difficult for out of state 
prisoners, since all the contacts that make reintegration possible—potential 
employers, landlords and social service providers—are far away. 239  Equally 
important, studies have repeatedly found that visitation significantly decreased the 
risk of recidivism, particularly with those inmates with little other social support.240 
Since “returning prisoners face a number of obstacles to successful reintegration, 
including unemployment, debt, homelessness, substance abuse, and family 
conflict,”241 housing them in far-away prisons makes the transition all the more 
difficult and risky. 
 
C.  Questionable Cost Savings 
 
Private prison companies thrive due to their alleged cost savings, promising 
millions saved in taxpayer funds. Yet repeated investigations have found that these 
prison privatizers base their contracts on imaginary costs and a set formula, saving 
state and local governments little if any money in the long run.242 In part, this is 
because private prisons can often cherry-pick the least expensive, least dangerous 
prisoners for their facilities, leaving a state’s public prisons with the sickest and most 
violent inmates, the most expensive and most difficult to house.243 Even when a 
prison facility is outsourced, the state must continue to be involved. Generally, the 
state is tasked with overseeing and administering private prisons in the correctional 
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system, creating additional governmental cost, even if state employees aren’t 
staffing or running the prisons.244 
Minimal staffing of prisons and jails, as described above, is also another way 
that for-profit prison companies save money, claiming to pass those lower costs on 
to the state. But this bare-bones provision of correctional officers and security guards 
imposes high costs on both inmates and guards. The pressure to keep costs down is 
illustrated through not only minimalist staffing,245 correctional officer pay,246 and 
training,247 but also in decisions that keeps programming for inmates, usually staff 
intensive, at the barest of levels.248  
Occupancy requirements are another way that privatizing corrections can cost 
a state as much as running public facilities. A large majority of private prison 
contracts—over sixty-five percent require the state or local government to guarantee 
a minimum number of bodies in prison or jail beds, or else required payment to make 
up for empty prison cells.249 Most quotas require ninety percent occupancy.250 These 
quotas make state taxpayers responsible for guaranteeing profits for private prison 
companies, instead of saving them money, as was promised.251 
In addition, cost comparisons often fail to account for differences in health care 
costs for sick inmates, who normally remain in state supervision.252 Contracts with 
private prison companies usually restrict their inmate intake to those prisoners who 
are healthy, young, and have fewer psychiatric needs.253 In Florida, for example, a 
study done by an internal government accountability office found a variety of 
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included failing to ensure that private prisons housed inmates with all different levels 
of health needs, both mental and physical, as do the rest of the state prisons.254 As 
special needs inmates are more expensive, accepting only healthy inmates in 
privately-run prisons results in the state bearing a larger proportion of the cost of 
housing them.255 
A number of recent studies have shown that using private, for-profit companies 
to run prisons and jails does not save state and local governments any money. In 
2010, the Arizona Auditor General found that “it may be more costly to house 
inmates in private prisons” than public institutions.256 Similarly, a 2010 New Jersey 
study found that “most objective cost studies [of privatized prisons] show[] little or 
no cost savings to taxpayers coupled with an increased safety risk.”257 And a 2007 
meta-analysis of previous privatization studies by University of Utah researchers 
found that “[c]ost savings from privatization are not guaranteed and quality of 
services is not improved.” 258  Although other studies have found privatized 
corrections provide some cost savings, the evidence is mixed, at best.259  
Ultimately, the lack of oversight, extreme profits, lackadaisical attitude towards 
prisoner welfare, and constant nickel-and-diming of impoverished inmates are all 
hallmarks of what happens when privatizing corrections occurs in the criminal 
justice system. Whatever benefits are gained accrue almost entirely to the private 
entity. 
 
III.  PUNISHMENT AS A COMMUNITY RIGHT 
 
When punishment of offenders passes from public to private, there are a wide 
variety of consequences, and none of them are good. As the history of private 
incarceration illustrates, private corrections in this country were built over a 
quicksand of racism, slavery, and profit. The resurrection of private prison labor 
gangs, “lent” out to local counties by corrections companies in an effort to buy favor, 
draws from the same shaky ground. 
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In large part, private corrections have been so trouble-prone because granting 
the power to determine and impose punishment has always been a role for the local 
community, not profit-driven outsiders looking to commercialize incarceration. The 
more that private, for-profit companies are allowed to dictate the terms of 
punishment and corrections, the less benefit either the offender or the community 
receives. 
 
A.  The Troubled History of Private Incarceration 
 
The practice of private payment for incarcerating offenders dates back to the 
beginning days of our republic. In early American history, local governments would 
reimburse private jailers for a form of pretrial detention, to hold the accused facing 
trial.260 Early jails, which were primarily holding cells for debtors or for pre-trial 
detainees, were overcrowded, poorly kept, and unsanitary.261  
This first incarnation of privately-run corrections soon ended after the creation 
of the first publicly run prison in 1790.262 Soon almost all offenders were confined 
in local or state-run correctional facilities. There was one major exception, however, 
to the eradication of private incarceration: the use of inmate labor.  
American prisons have a long and disturbing history when it comes to profiting 
from prisoner labor. In early prisons, prisoners were routinely put to work as part of 
the larger purpose of prisoner reform.263 This purpose shifted during the Civil War 
with the passage of the 13th Amendment, which outlawed slavery and involuntary 
servitude “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted.”264  
Convict leasing, which was designed to get around the existence of the 
13th Amendment, was widely utilized in the postbellum South. It both offered a 
means to help defray incarceration costs as well as helped rebuild the ruins of the 
South.265 The convict laws of the post-Reconstruction South were regulations that 
were intended to help control and utilize black male labor.266 Following the Civil 
War, eight Southern states enacted convict laws, which permitted the hiring of 
county prisoners to plantation owners and private companies.267 In addition, nine 
southern states adopted vagrancy laws, making it a criminal offense not to work, and 
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applied them selectively to black men.268 This provided a constant stream of black 
prison laborers. The system of convict leasing invariably resulted in severe abuse of 
the prisoners, who were treated as less than human.269 Few if any of the monies made 
were paid to prisoners.270  
The purpose of both the convict and vagrancy laws was to help establish a new 
system of free, forced labor.271 The South’s aggressive enforcement and punishment 
of even minor criminal offenses against blacks created a market for convict leasing, 
where prisoners were rented as day laborers to the highest private bidder.272 Soon, 
however, Southern prisons and jails simply went into the convict-leasing business 
themselves, reaping even greater profits.273 This economic bonanza created a strong 
incentive to convict and lock up as many freedmen as possible to keep a steady 
supply of labor.274 
Prisons and jails continued to lease convicts into the twentieth century. By the 
late 1920s, most states stopped leasing out their convict laborers, instead keeping 
them to work on public projects in chain gangs.275 Legislation was eventually passed 
requiring that convicts labor only on public works.276 The chain gangs of the 1930s, 
however, differed little from the convict leasing system, relying on the same tactics 
of humiliation and dehumanization.277  Eventually, the chain gang’s widespread 
abuses lead to its eradication around the middle of the twentieth century.278 
The North had its private prison systems as well, distinct from the South’s use 
of inmate labor and chain gangs. For example, New York utilized private prisons in 
the nineteenth century, using a “fee system” where independent prison operators 
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charged per-inmate.279 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, for-profit 
prisons and jails had been mostly eradicated, as concerns about safety, health, 
sanitation, and conditions of incarceration led to widespread closure.280 Generally, 
private businesses were only involved in providing contracted services to 
correctional facilities, such as food preparation, medical care, and transportation.281  
Concern about rising incarceration costs, however, resurrected privatized 
corrections in the 1980s. CCA incorporated in 1983,282 and went public a year later, 
contending that its use of surveillance and corrections facilities design made it 
possible to run institutions with fewer guards.283 Under the name “The Wackenhut 
Corporation,” GEO Group was created the same year, going public in 1997.284 By 
1997, CCA had transformed into a real estate investment trust (“REIT”) for tax 
purposes,285 claiming that it was primarily in the property-owning business.286 The 
GEO Group eventually followed suit in 2013.287  Also in 1997, CCA’s newest 
affiliate, Prison Realty Trust, raised $447 million to buy more correctional facilities 
to add to their growing empire.288  
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What distinguishes these new versions of for-profit prisons from the previous 
types private prisons is, in part, their marketing. To the founder of CCA, selling 
private prison services is no different than selling anything else: “you just sell it like 
you were selling cars or real estate or hamburgers.”289 Although CCA is marketing 
the incarceration and regulation of human beings, not merchandise, the sales pitch 
follows the same format.  
One painfully familiar aspect of private prison practices is the resurgence of 
inmate work gangs. Indeed, CCA has used its provision of free inmate labor as a 
selling point to states, pointing out that in one of its first years of operating, Bay 
County, Florida received $600,000 in “free” labor.290 Today’s use of inmate work 
crews by private prison companies to provide free labor is all too familiar. Private 
prison leasing of inmate labor commodifies poor minority bodies for state, local, and 
commercial profit.  
Allowing private companies to sell their services to state and local governments 
not only resurrects the specter of slavery and Jim Crow, but also steps on the need 
for the community to determine and impose punishments, as developed further 
below. 
 
B.  Expressive Restorative Retribution and the Community 
 
Why is it so critical that the local community, not private, for-profit companies, 
help determine and impose punishment on offenders? For one, when a distant agent, 
instead of the local or state government, is primarily or solely responsible for doling 
out the moral blame of punishment, offenders may not feel responsible for their 
actions, because the actual, physical fact of their punishment is so far attenuated 
from the community who imposed it. When a private, for-profit company imposes 
and enforces incarceration and its related punishments, the offender may instead 
attribute her punishment to the private company, shrugging off the desired feelings 
of responsibility or awareness of her wrongdoing. In contrast, when the local 
government is in charge of determining and imposing corrections, the wrongdoer 
has more difficulty avoiding the burden of criminal responsibility, because her 
fellow citizens, community, and society itself has pronounced her blameworthiness. 
The power of expressive values in criminal law and punishment play an 
important role in corrections. Law and legal process has a strong effect on individual 
behavior through their power to affect the social, normative meaning of that 
behavior.291 More specifically, community participation in the determination and 
imposition of criminal punishment helps express the people’s beliefs and values 
about the wrongdoer, the crime, and the injury to society. The expressive aspect of 
the community’s decision is particularly apparent in the punishment phase of the 
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adjudication and sentencing, since the actual imposition of punishment has always 
had public, communal value.  
By eliminating the community and local government from the imposition of 
punishment through private corrections, much of the expressive value of community 
punishment is lost. This sort of loss threatens the democratic legitimacy and political 
salience of the state.292 To work properly, legal expressions such as the imposition 
of criminal punishment must enlist and utilize the natural sense of justice among the 
citizenry. 293  Delegating such punishment to a private, for-profit corrections 
company makes this goal impossible. 
Moreover, as a distributive principle, retributive justice supports the use of only 
state or locally-run corrections. Every time the offender commits a crime, she 
undermines the sovereign will of the people by challenging their decision-making 
structure. 294  Because criminal laws in liberal democracies reflect a democratic 
pedigree of criminal laws, crimes are expressions of superiority to the state and the 
community. When we punish an offender who knows or should have known her 
actions were illegal, she learns that her actions matter to the community—especially 
a community created by shared laws.  
By involving the will of the people through the imposition of punishment 
within local and state-run corrections, it helps send the clear message that the 
offender is being punished for the unfairness she created in the community. 
Punishment imposed by private corrections, on the other hand, fails to send this 
message, because the penance is imposed by an outside source, completely 
unconnected to the state, government, or community. A framework of retributive 
justice cannot function without some involvement from the lay public, since its 
legitimacy is threatened without the actual imposition of punishment from the 
community. Thus, whatever retributive meaning a punishment may have is almost 
entirely lost in the realms of private corrections.  
Restorative justice also has an important role to play when the community is 
involved with crime and punishment. Most supporters of restorative justice 
understand it to include a set of moral and substantive principles, including 
responsibility, remorse, atonement, making amends, moral learning, forgiveness, 
and reconciliation. 295  Restoring fairness and equalizing the community are 
important components of restorative justice, which envisions crime as “a violation 
of people and relationships that creates obligations to make things right.”296  
A restorative theory of punishment conceptualizes justice as a process that 
incorporates both the community and the offender in an attempt to repair and 
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reconcile the harm done. 297  Private correction companies, on the other hand, 
envision crime and justice only as routes to profit. Neither retributive nor restorative 
justice can result from privatizing our state punishment, as our current system of 
private punishment, run by large for-profit companies, has money-making as its 
primary goal.  
Restorative justice also contains aspects of expressive philosophy, because 
expressive theories help publicize the negative aspects of the crime and convey 
punishment’s condemning message.298 Restorative justice processes promote social 
disapproval of crime by the very expression of condemnation handed down by the 
community. This is far more meaningful than punishment imposed by private 
companies. In the restorative justice paradigm, community disapproval is the 
predominant deterrence to misconduct; thus the stronger the community 
involvement, the safer the community. Restorative justice is not private justice,299 
and privatized corrections, focused as they are on profit, have only one goal: the 
bottom line. 
Another aspect of restorative justice where the participation of the community 
has been critical is the reintegration and rehabilitation of prisoners when they are 
released. 300  Community involvement has been absolutely vital in helping 
reconstitute societal bonds with the offender after she has served her punishment. 
Private corrections companies, however, are unconcerned with what happens with 
offenders once they are no longer in their control. This is particularly ironic given 
these companies’ level of involvement in alternative corrections, which theoretically 
exist to help reintegrate the offender back into the community.  
 
C.  Psychological Effects of Racial Disparity in Privatized Corrections 
 
The psychological effect upon offenders imprisoned in private corrections 
cannot be ignored, especially given the substantial racial disparity among such 
prisoners. Offenders incarcerated by private companies quickly learn that the 
primary function of their imprisonment is to increase profits for the parent 
companies. This is signaled in numerous ways, as detailed above, including 
substandard facilities, care, programs, and supervision, along with dangerous 
conditions and abuse.301 Far from absorbing the message that is meant to be sent by 
the community—that they are being punished for their wrongdoing in injuring 
society—these offenders learn only that they are at the bottom of the imprisoned 
heap, not even valued enough to be punished by the government or local community.  
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Furthermore, the message sent to the local community through the use of 
private prisons is equally destructive. The use of private prisons and jails sends a 
message to the offender’s community that it is acceptable to impose substandard 
conditions upon offenders who are impoverished, non-white, or a combination of 
the two.  
For-profit prisons hold more people of color than government-run facilities, a 
reality that has strong and troubling implications.302 First, the containment of people 
of color, relative to “non-Hispanic, white[s],” functions primarily as a source of 
profit extraction.303 Second, the incarceration in private prisons strongly suggests 
that communities of color are seen as unworthy of taxpayer supported public 
investment.304 The high level of minority offenders incarcerated in private prisons 
also illustrates how they disproportionally suffer from facilities providing the least 
access to educational and rehabilitative services. 305  Indeed, the substantial 
overrepresentation of people of color in facilities controlled by for-profit firms 
suggests that people of color are excluded from traditional national conceptions of 
“the commons.”306 People of color continue to be seen in the national imagination 
as sources of profit extraction and not necessarily as citizens deserving of public 
services, thus continuing to be unable to participate fully in this nation’s democratic 
experiment.307 
Thus, the use of private corrections fails both the offender and the community 
in the areas of expressive, retributive, and restorative justice. This is closely tied to 
the community’s critical role to play in determining punishment for local offenders. 
My other articles detail the community’s proper role in deciding punishment in the 
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areas of bail, 308 sentencing,309 probation,310 parole,311 post-release supervision,312 
and criminal justice debt,313 among others. Usually the role of the local community 
ends post-sentencing hearing. The realities of prison privatizers and the many 
different aspects of private punishment, however, should make us reconsider this 
end. The need for more local participation in enacting punishment on offenders 
unquestionably arises with the current grim realities of privatized punishment.  
At its best, community-based criminal punishment provides for strong local, 
popular participation within existing criminal justice institutions. As shown above, 
when the actual imposition of sentence and punishment is taken away from local 
governments and given to faceless, privatized companies, everything and everyone 
suffers. As explored in Part IV, granting this power to for-profit privatizers exacts a 
heavy cost on community rights, legitimate punishment, and local, democratic 
control. 
 
IV.  RETURNING TO LOCAL CONTROL 
 
Since the beginning of the American criminal justice system, we have relied on 
the community to adjudicate crime and punishment. As William Stuntz contended, 
“[m]ake criminal
 
justice more locally democratic, and justice will be both more 
moderate and more egalitarian.”314 This is because criminal justice creates value by 
generating societal opinions of how best to apply legal rules and adjudicate 
offenses.315 More specifically, it is the community’s shared principles of justice that 
make the rule of law both workable and legitimate.316  
The power of moral credibility and pressure of social norms also lend a hand 
in obtaining compliance with society’s rules of conduct, by using the influence of 
the forces of social and individual moral control.
 
Local community-level social 
processes have much more effect on the prevention and promotion of crime and 
delinquency than do the characteristics of individual offenders. 
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American normative theories of democracy and democratic deliberation have 
always included community involvement in all aspects of criminal justice. The right 
to a jury—the local community—to determine your guilt or innocence has always 
been a seminal concept in American democratic theory. 317  If you accept that 
conceptions of egalitarian moral worth are part of our culture’s normative values 
and have therefore set the standards for acceptable treatment of people in our society, 
then the lay citizenry must be part of the determination and imposition of 
punishment, from the beginning of the criminal justice process to its endpoint. 
 
A.  Local Control 
 
Despite our continual focus on federal crime and punishment, criminal justice 
is a largely local process, with primarily local effects. As a result, the lay community 
must be involved much more substantially in its application. Citizens need to 
participate in criminal justice decisions to both legitimize criminal punishment and 
make the process more democratic. Indeed, true democracy requires that we commit 
both process and value to governance by the people.318  
Traditionally, this participation has occurred through the auspices of the petit 
or grand jury. However, as jury trials have dwindled to a mere 1–5% of criminal 
justice adjudications, it is important to find other ways for the local community to 
get involved. “[T]he most important benefit of localism in criminal justice [is] . . . its 
tendency to make the enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the values, 
priorities, and felt needs of local communities.”319
 
This localism benefit has always 
been a particular hallmark of our criminal justice system, as crime has always been 
specifically envisioned as an offense against the local community. In other words, 
localism is inherent in the American conception of criminal punishment—indeed, it 
is hardwired into our historical and constitutional understanding of criminal 
justice.320  
When criminal punishment parallels the community’s local understanding of 
justice, the punishment gains legitimacy and promotes compliance by urging the 
populace to view it as a moral authority in uncertain situations.321 Allowing private, 
for-profit corrections companies to impose such punishment cuts this important link. 
As Martha Minow has queried, what happens to these kind of public values when 
public commitments proceed through private agents?322  
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Minow herself partially answers her question, pointing out how many “new 
versions of privatization potentially jeopardize public purposes by pressing for 
market-style competition, by sidestepping norms that apply to public programs, and 
by eradicating the public identity of social efforts to meet human needs.”323 These 
concerns are particularly salient with privatized corrections, which combine profit-
based motives with reduced services and hidden internal machinations, eradicating 
any of the concerns and norms of the local community. 
As Minow explains, there is a strong argument for viewing the regulation and 
administration of correctional facilities as a public task, because the political system 
currently assigns a monopoly over the legitimate use of force to the government.324 
Minow argues that using private actors in the correctional context may undermine 
the legitimacy of government action, since the public may suspect that their focus is 
private profit-making, rather than the traditional purposes of criminal justice.325 
Indeed, allowing for-profit companies to provide services that previously were 
public raises worrying questions about public participation in the criminal justice 
system, as well as the effects this has upon the character of the polity.326  
Privatizing corrections tends to fundamentally alter the relationship between 
state and society in the criminal context. 327  This is because such privatization 
removes punishment and corrections from the local and state governmental 
control—control specifically delegated from the local community—and places it in 
in the hands of for-profit companies that have minimal interest in reinforcing the 
public norms underlying our basic assumptions of criminal justice.328 By entrusting 
the decision-making and implementation of punishment to entirely private entities, 
we not only cut off any last aspect of community involvement, but also cede to 
private actors the sovereignty over a fundamental societal and community function: 
the act of punishment.  
Moreover, using private corrections companies creates the public perception 
that the connection between the community and the imposition and regulation of 
punishment has been cut. In our criminal justice system, it is the community’s role 
to determine an offender’s punishment, while the actual administration of 
punishment is normally delegated to the democratically elected local government. 
But when the government then outsources this critical function to private, for-profit 
companies, the community gets the message that their essential role—as determiners 
of social norms—has been excised. No longer is the lay community’s voice or 
message imposed. As the Israeli Supreme Court argued in a decision banning the 
use of private prisons: “The administration of prisons and jails involves the legally 
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sanctioned coercion of some citizens by others. This coercion is exercised in the 
name of the offended public.”329  Indeed, granting the power to inflict criminal 
sanctions to private, for–profit companies neatly severs the link between the local 
community’s adjudication of the offense/determination of punishment and the 
infliction of the sanction.330 
The role of the local becomes ever more important when we make a careful 
study of privatized punishment. The worst excesses and greatest oversights all seem 
to occur when private corrections entities eliminate any local investment or 
interaction with incarceration and punishment, running all operations from one 
nationwide center. Although this might promote efficiency and increase profits, the 
effects of this one-size-fits-all approach can be disastrous for both offenders and 
communities.  
 
B.  Delegation, Democracy, and the People 
 
In addition to trampling on local, democratic participation in criminal justice, 
allowing private prisons to impose sanctions and punishments on incarcerated 
offenders is an inappropriate delegation of power. Despite some troubling historical 
practices, punishment and the use of physical coercion have always been understood 
as government prerogatives. 331  When state or local governments delegate the 
authority to execute these duties to entities with dubious accountability to the public 
interest,332 we run into serious problems. Although private entities often administer 
state programs, usually those entities are not as directly involved in corporal 
punishment as are the current crop of private corrections companies.  
Another undemocratic aspect of privatized corrections is the imposition of 
punishment for profit. Granted, in all corrections discipline, any alleged 
transgression is adjudicated by an internal prison administrator—often minimally 
trained—ranging from guards to the parole board to the probation officer.333 In 
private corrections, however, particularly privatized alternate corrections such as 
probation, this imposition is more troubling. For every punishment imposed that 
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extends an inmate’s term, the private corrections company makes more money. It is 
a classic conflict of interest that has, until recently, gone largely unnoticed.334 
As discussed in Part I, corrections officers generally make multiple disciplinary 
decisions daily, with little oversight or review.335 These disciplinary decisions can 
result in a loss of “good time credit,” which applies toward early release, or 
placement in administrative segregation.336 In private jails and prisons, each loss of 
good time credit means one more day incarcerated, which means one more day of 
profit.337 Perhaps unsurprisingly, one study found that CCA inmates lost good time 
credit at nearly eight times as much as did inmates in a state-run prison.338  
The profit motive engendered by these private corrections companies creates 
perverse incentives to extend inmate sentences and punishment. In addition, the 
profit-based motives of private corrections companies reflexively promote criminal 
justice policies that produce enhanced sanctions for the most minor of infractions, 
without any consideration of whether the policies are in the public interest.339  
Imposing punishment on incarcerated offenders also implicates an improper 
delegation of the local community’s traditional role in adjudicating and imposing all 
forms of punishment. The delegation of essential community and governmental 
functions to private corrections companies poses a very real threat to democratic 
accountability, the rule of law, and punishment.340  
In addition, delegating the imposition of punishment to private companies 
raises issues with transparency and public accountability, legitimacy, and nonpublic 
motives.341 Each are discussed briefly below. 
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1.  Transparency and Public Accountability 
 
It is extremely difficult to obtain any public accountability from private 
corrections. Allowing for-profit companies to take over jails, prisons, probation, and 
post-release supervision means increasing the veil of secrecy that already pervades 
American corrections. Privatized correctional facilities operate with an almost 
complete lack of transparency, as they are not subject to the kind of oversight 
required for state and federal prisons.342 Indeed, “the private prison industry operates 
in secrecy while being funded almost entirely with public taxpayer money.”343  
This lack of transparency touches on a major requirement for imposition of 
punishment on offenders: the need for accountability to the local community. 
Because prisons, jails, and other sorts of correctional controls play a very public role 
in our criminal justice system, it is necessary that the local community carefully 
scrutinize the inner workings, in order to ensure that local punishment norms are 
followed. 
This opaqueness in private corrections goes against the tenets of restorative and 
retributive justice, which focus on letting the local populace make transparent 
decisions about punishment in full view of, and with oversight by, the greater 
community. Although H.R. 2470, the “Private Prison Information Act,”344 which 
requires greater transparency and Freedom of Information Act rights for the dealings 
of private prison companies, was introduced in the House on May 20, 2015, the bill 
was referred to committee and has lingered there ever since.345 This means that 
private, for-profit companies can continue to run correctional facilities however they 
like, with little to hold them accountable. Even if the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
ultimately decides to end its association with private corrections, this still leaves the 
many state, local, and county offenders subject to the private corrections industry’s 
arbitrary and undemocratic power to punish on the government’s behalf.  
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Transparency is integral to the democratic project,346 and penal transparency 
even more so. Generally, however, prisons and jails are not particularly 
transparent,347 and private correction facilities even less so. There is very little public 
information for prisons or jails, and virtually none for halfway houses, recovery 
centers, and other correctional alternatives. As such, scholars have argued for 
increased penal transparency in five areas: 1) physical safety; 2) health; 3) 
institutional employment/education; 4) internal discipline; and 5) recidivism.348  
This kind of transparency is even more necessary in the world of privatized 
corrections. The vast majority of private facilities need not disclose information 
arising from public records requests, as opposed to government-run prisons.349 As 
noted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, “private prison 
contractors . . . are not typically required to report on the inmates housed in privately 
run prisons, do not make these data easily accessible to monitors, or are even aware 
of the documentation and reporting requirements intrinsic to the operation of public 
agencies.”350 Therefore, increasing public access to the workings of private facilities 
would allow the much-needed scrutiny of correctional conditions and operations by 
the local community.351  
The need for transparency and public accountability in criminal punishment 
applies to all kinds of corrections. Stephanos Bibas has written persuasively about 
the great divide between insiders and outsiders in the criminal justice system, and 
how this continuous secrecy impairs public confidence in the law.352 The private 
corrections industry, however, has been the most resistant to providing any insight, 
overview, or accountability in their practices, even within a secretive, closed-door 
industry. We need a combination of transparency and accountability to not only 
uphold the rights of people under criminal justice control,353 but also to vindicate the 
rights of the local community to determine and administer punishment. Private 
corrections’ refusal to open up their processes bypasses local control of punishment, 
something that is inseparable from our democratic decision-making. 
Likewise, the rush to privatize probation has given tremendous law 
enforcement authority and oversight to for-profit companies, who have transformed 
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punishment into a relentless machine for collection of criminal justice debt.354 Here, 
as well, there is an almost complete lack of transparency. In many states, these 
private probation companies do not fall under the state’s open records law, due to 
private probation-sponsored statutes making all private probation records 
confidential.355 Whatever the size of these private corrections companies, the public 
must be able to obtain complete accountability and transparency without difficulty. 
This is particularly important because the companies serve a public function in 
criminal justice, thus acting as a proxy for the government itself.356  
The cost of imprisonment is another compelling reason to require transparency 
and accountability from private corrections companies, particularly given the false 
promise of cost savings. Often the lay public accepts the takeover of local prisons, 
jails, probation, halfway houses, and rehabilitation services because it believes this 
will save money while providing the same services.357 Full knowledge of a private 
corrections company’s transactions, however, might change the public acceptance 
of private corrections companies. This includes such routine practices as 
understaffing, poor or non-existent medical care, high interest on criminal justice 
debts, elimination of in-person visitation, ruinous phone rates, and toxic food, all of 
which can ultimately lead to higher costs for taxpayers. At minimum, requiring data 
collection, record keeping, and publication of private correction records to force 
transparency can help foster a public debate on the wisdom of corrections 
privatization, hopefully promoting more rational decision-making in the realm of 
criminal justice.358  
The public requires sufficient information about the operation of these 
privatized criminal justice institutions to properly judge the utility of such 
operations. As the criminal justice system continues to privatize, there is ever more 
of a need for transparency and accountability.359 It is likely that more transparency 
will lead to less privatization, since the practices associated with the rampant cost-
cutting of private corrections are not likely to survive serious scrutiny. 
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2.  Legitimacy 
 
Americans do not have much confidence in the fairness or effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system.360 As Jeffrey Fagan notes, “[t]he disquiet threatens to erode 
the public perception that the criminal law and legal institutions are legitimate and 
raises the prospect of disengagement of citizens from the important collaborations 
that are essential to the co-production of security.”361 These observations ring even 
more true when it comes to the perception and role of private corrections within our 
criminal justice system.  
Fagan articulates three major issues with criminal justice legitimacy, all of 
which resonate strongly when considering using private corrections companies to 
run criminal institutions. First, there are significant concerns about the criminal 
system’s lack of procedural fairness and respectful, dignified treatment of citizens, 
all of which erode legitimacy in the eyes of the public.362 As Part I details, the 
random, chaotic nature of institutions run by private correction companies, from the 
casual, ingrained violence to the arbitrary imposition of excess punishment to the 
callous disregard of medical needs, violate the basic tenets of procedural fairness 
and dispense with dignity for the incarcerated or probationary citizen. 
Second, Fagan argues that the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is 
undermined by the public’s continually negative perception of the distribution of 
justice, along with its growing apprehension over the proportionality and 
consistency of legal responses to criminal behavior.363 This concern is particularly 
applicable to the growing role of private probation, parole, and post-release 
supervision, where private industry has squeezed an endless stream of money out of 
the poorest of offenders. As discussed above, these probation companies frequently 
function to indebt offenders, not to rehabilitate them. Such disproportionate 
punishment of minor offenders, on top of the already existing punishment handed 
down by the courts, is perceived as illegitimate and highly undemocratic. In the end, 
endless criminal justice debt ends up imposing as much punishment for minor 
offenses as for much greater offenses.  
Fagan’s third point contends that criminal justice legitimacy is weakened by 
concern over the criminal law’s waning capacity to detect wrongdoing and protect 
citizens.364 Within the world of private corrections, privatized criminal institutions 
routinely fail to detect wrongdoing and protect citizens within their walls, thus 
undermining the belief in reliability and fairness that the public generally holds 
about crime and corrections. The high rates of death, violence and injury in private 
corrections destabilize any possible belief in the justice served in such institutions. 
In addition, the relentless profit-squeezing occurring at virtually every private 
corrections facility is enough to make any citizen doubt that these companies protect 
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anything but their own self-interests. Privatized corrections makes a mockery out of 
any legitimate protective role these institutions might have, and greatly destabilizes 
community trust in the back end of the criminal justice system.  
The criminal law derives some of its legitimacy from “citizens participat[ing] 
as clients, overseers, and participants in the production of justice.”365 As discussed 
in greater detail in Part V, one way in which privatized corrections could gain more 
legitimacy in the people’s eyes would be to have more community oversight and 
participation in its regulation. As Fagan argues, such a “regulatory function 
influences not only the conduct of the institution, but also its perception by others 
coming into contact with it.”366 Thus having the local community help oversee, at 
minimum, the health, safety, basic offender living conditions, and profit margins of 
these privatized corrections companies would not only improve the standards, but 
also increase legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
 
3.  Non-public Motives 
 
As discussed in Part I, the lack of any public motive within private corrections 
companies has created a system where the companies reduce inmate services and 
quality of life to chase after every last cent. This is not to say that public, 
government-run corrections have been any Shangri-La; indeed, various non-profits 
have amply documented the problems with publicly-run correctional facilities.  
But privatizing corrections means that decisions are not focused on the best 
choice for the offenders or institution, but instead, the best choice for the company—
or, in the case of the largest privatized correction companies, what is best for the 
shareholder. Fiduciary duty towards the shareholder in a publicly traded company 
requires that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders.”367 Corporate law delineates that directors are bound by 
fiduciary duties and standards, which include “acting to promote the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”368 
Thus, publicly traded companies such as CCA and the GEO Group are legally 
and ethically required to focus on profit as the primary motivation for each action 
they take. In contrast, correctional facilities are (or are supposed to be) focused on 
the needs of offenders. Privatizing corrections risks serious conflicts between public 
and private interests,369 with public interest losing out to the profit motive. 
In addition, even a small amount of for-profit motivation in a traditionally non-
profit sector can destabilize belief and deference for government.370 This fate is 
particularly dangerous for the criminal justice system, which has recently been under 
great public scrutiny for its failures of justice.  
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C.  Delegating Imprisonment 
 
Punishment and imprisonment has traditionally been a power reserved to the 
government, whether federal, state, or local. Of course, some governmental 
functions cannot be delegated at all. 371  Although delegating punishment and 
imprisonment seems to pass constitutional muster, do we truly want to delegate the 
function of incarcerating, punishing, deterring, and rehabilitating offenders to a 
private entity,372 particularly one so focused on profit? 
Granted, it is sometimes difficult to sharply separate public and private in our 
modern governance.373 Some have argued that our system of privatization is less a 
governmental withdrawal than a public-private partnership where there is a regime 
of “mixed administration in which both public and private actors share 
responsibilities.” 374  Instead, privatization tends to delegate power over 
governmental programs to individual private actors.375 This is particularly true with 
private corrections, “given that the right to physically constrain and coerce others is 
ordinarily reserved for the state.” 376  When there is mixed private-public 
administration, much of the discretion is left to the third-party private actors377—a 
result that can be disastrous, as demonstrated, when it comes private corrections.  
Alexander Volokh has argued that there is no inherent, normatively relevant 
difference between public and private providers of government services, including 
prisons.378 Volokh contends that prison privatization does not violate the federal 
non-delegation doctrine, since the doctrine, derived from Article I’s vesting clause, 
focuses on how much power Congress gives up; in other words, it doesn’t matter 
whether the recipient of the delegated power is public or private.379 Yet even Volokh 
notes that for some states, the delegation doctrine is more cautious, warning that 
private delegations can be more worrisome that public ones due to the possibility of 
“public powers being abandoned to those who are neither elected by the people, 
appointed by a public official or entity, nor employed by the government.”380  
Even assuming that delegation of imprisoning and punishing offenders is 
within constitutional bounds, however, there are numerous reasons why the private 
corrections experiment of the last thirty years has not only been a failure, but has 
also had detrimental cost to society. The average citizen feels very distanced from 
                                                   
371 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1; Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the 
Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813, 823 (1987).  
372 Robbins, supra note 371, at 823. 
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378 Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 
46 U.C.D.  L. REV. 133, 147 (2012).  
379 Id. at 154–55. 
380 Id. at 156 (quoting Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. Inc v. Lewellen, 952 
S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 1997)). 
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the inner workings of the criminal justice system. This distance is only increased by 
the use of private correction companies. When we grant a for-profit company the 
ability to control punishment, despite previous poor performance, it strongly signals 
to local citizens that they are true outsiders to the criminal process.  
Moreover, outsourcing corrections contracts to the lower bidder transmits the 
message that once convicted, offenders are mere commodities like any other 
product, with cost savings the only metric that matters. As Justice Arbel of the Israeli 
Supreme Court contends, employing private corrections “undermines the moral 
authority underlying the activity of that enterprise and public confidence in it, since 
even if justice is done, it is not seen to be done.”381  Public perceptions matter 
tremendously in criminal justice, and the wrong perceptions are created when 
privatized corrections are in charge. 
 
V.  RESTORING THE COMMUNITY ROLE IN IMPOSING PUNISHMENT 
 
The role of the community in determining punishment, if expanded to its full 
breadth, encompasses not just the ability to decide and impose appropriate 
punishment, but also the right to determine the level of all the punishments that 
follow sentencing. My previous articles have argued for the need for more 
community participation in the back-end of sentencing: including parole, post-
sentence probation, and post-release supervision.382 There is no reason that this 
community participation and oversight could not extend to the wide realm of 
punitive sanctions doled out in private prisons, jails, and the many forms of 
alternative incarceration, like probation and halfway houses. 
One practical way to help restore the community role in corrections punishment 
is to require a rotating committee of citizens to help supervise any prison, jail or 
alternative corrections facility run by a private, for-profit contractor.383 This would 
include overseeing all aspects of private corrections as practiced, including 
outsourced services such as prison food, banking, transportation, telephony, 
visitation, and health care. Although general court oversight of prison systems is not 
uncommon, there are few oversight boards or committees reviewing correctional 
facilities, and very few with local citizen involvement. 
  
                                                   
381 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. HCJ 2605/05 
109 (2009) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_ eng/05/050/026/n39/05026050.n39.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y6U8-LNAZ]. 
382 APPLEMAN, supra note 310, at 191–203. 
383 There is a strong case to be made that ALL correctional facilities, whether public or 
privately run, should have outside oversight. Unquestionably there are multiple problems 
with correctional facilities in general, not just ones run by prison privatizers. But the most 
critical place to begin is in private corrections, given its many issues. 
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The criminal justice system is familiar with the use of oversight boards or 
committees. Oversight boards and committees have been supervising and reviewing 
police departments for the past twenty-five years, with some limited success. There 
is no reason such boards could not be expanded to private correction facilities. As 
we have seen, private corrections, more than any other form of corrections, is most 
in need of community oversight. 
Why use civilian community boards instead of court oversight? For one, court 
oversight, which usually only results as a consequence of protracted litigation, can 
be extremely expensive.384 In addition, obtaining a consent decree for a court (or the 
federal government) to supervise a prison system is complicated and lengthy. In 
contrast, putting together an oversight board of civilians, or a mix of the local public 
and key community representatives, would be much easier and more efficient, 
requiring the power of the local or state government at most.  
Moreover, incorporating local citizens into the workings of private corrections 
would ensure that a fresh take would be provided. Requiring the operations of 
private prisons, jails, and alternative corrections to pass before the eyes of a 
community oversight board would provide a window into any back-door dealings 
and secret machinations. Enhancing local, popular participation within an existing 
criminal justice institution,385 such as the private corrections industry, combines the 
positives of community involvement without requiring new procedures or 
immediate overhaul of the existing system. 
An external evaluation system of private correction facility operations is 
necessary, particularly considering the punitive sanctions imposed within. We 
cannot rely on any of the current parties—the state/county or the private corrections 
industry—to reliably protect the public interest. One way of achieving such public 
scrutiny, transparency, and accountability, however, is through a careful, focused 
use of a citizen oversight board. These citizen oversight boards have been used 
successfully in New York 386  and Los Angeles, 387  for both police and sheriff’s 
departments. The basic structure could easily be adapted to oversee the many levels 
of private corrections that have evolved in today’s market.  
                                                   
384 For example, litigation about Rhode Island’s prison system, one of the smallest in 
the country (with 675 prisoners in custody), lasted 22 years and cost millions. See ACLU, 
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT LITIGATION DOCKET 7 (2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/docket_march_2017_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QSU4-7GK9]. 
385 Lanni, supra note 295, at 363. 
386 New York City has a Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”), an independent 
agency “empowered to receive, investigate, mediate, hear, make findings, and recommend 
action on complaints against New York City police officers alleging the use of excessive or 
unnecessary force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or the use of offensive language.” About 
CCRB: Mission, CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BOARD, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/ 
about.page [https://perma.cc/XVX7-KWTL] (last visited Sept. 1, 2017). 
387 Cindy Chang & Abby Sewell, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dept. to Get Civilian 
Oversight, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
sheriff-oversight-20141210-story.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/34PK-CQEK]. 
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Oversight boards are nothing new. The call to oversee prisons, however, has 
come with renewed force in recent years. Most recently, there has been popular 
demand to oversee the New York state prison facilities, alleging that the New York 
State Commission of Correction’s actions and oversight have been practically 
useless.388 This is no surprise. Having bureaucratic oversight of facilities run by 
bureaucratic institutions, whether public or private, is unlikely to result in any major 
change. It is critical that the community be heavily involved in such oversight, 
particularly with private corrections facilities, to avoid such self-serving 
administration. 
There have been many calls for increased police transparency in the last few 
years. So, too, should there be demands for increased corrections transparency,389 
particularly those facilities run by private corrections companies. The ABA has 
endorsed such oversight corrections commissions, urging states, the federal 
government, and counties to “establish public entities that are independent of any 
correctional agency to regularly monitor and report publicly on the conditions in all 
prisons, jails, and other adult and juvenile correctional and detention facilities 
operating within their jurisdiction.”390 
What would this independent citizen corrections commission look like? First, 
it would need to be staffed primarily with community members, possibly along with 
former prisoners and representatives from major religious organizations (since these 
institutions are often intricately involved in post-incarcerative life). All of these 
commission members would need to serve two to three years at minimum,391 
perhaps on a staggered routine to ensure continuity, to enable working smoothly and 
efficiently.  
Critically, the private corrections oversight commission would need subpoena 
power and full access to all correction facility documents. The head of each private 
prison, as well as the heads of the privatized jails, halfway houses, and 
probation/post-release supervision programs, would need to report to such a 
commission on a regular basis, perhaps twice yearly, possibly more if there are 
persistent problems in any one sector of offender punishment.  
What would this commission decide? To be truly useful, it would need to have 
real power to oversee and change practices in whichever correctional facility or 
alternative that it oversees. These powers would need to carefully scrutinize and 
oversee every aspect of the programs that could affect the punishment of offenders, 
including at minimum: the use of force, particularly in “disciplining” inmates; 
conditions of confinement; the hiring, retention, and treatment of facility staff; the 
                                                   
388 Michele Deitch & Michael B. Mushlin, What’s Going on in Our Prisons?, N.Y. 
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use of solitary confinement, especially as a punitive measure; re-entry planning; the 
procedures for parole or probation violations; and privatized health care and 
transport, whether these are used by private or state-run corrections. Moreover, there 
would likely need to be a subsection of the committee that reviewed complaints and 
allegations of wrongdoing, including inmate grievances, abuse claims, denial of 
access to health care and inmate deaths.392 
As the ABA has noted about prisons in general, “[p]risoners still live in a 
netherworld with which few of us are familiar. . . . the operations of correctional and 
detention facilities [should] be transparent and accountable to the public they 
serve.”393 This is all the more true for private prisons, jails, probation, parole and 
halfway houses—with such minimal transparency, the inner workings of such 
facilities need overview and overhaul. Despite this obvious need for correctional 
oversight, though, it is relatively rare to find any independent supervisory 
commission whose findings are disseminated to the public in the United States,394 
let alone any independent commission that oversees private correctional facilities. 
In contrast, prisons in EU member countries are subject to independent monitoring 
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.395 
The ABA section on criminal justice has recently called for independent public 
entities to monitor and publicly report on conditions in prisons, jails, and other 
correctional and detention facilities for both adults and juveniles in their 
jurisdictions, whether public or private. The ABA has underlined the necessity of 
accessing such facilities and programs; only by granting lay entities broad and 
unhindered access to private facilities and programs, correctional personnel, and 
offenders, as well as any data about these conditions and procedures, will any 
accurate view emerge about the operations. 
Since corrections deals with extremely vulnerable populations, it is critical to 
provide adequate safeguards to protect those who communicate with the monitoring 
entity from retaliation or threats of retaliation.396 And because obstruction, codes of 
silence, and layers of secrecy often surround corrections in general—and private 
corrections in particular—the citizen commission must have the power to subpoena 
witnesses and documents.397  
These powers would need to be combined with random, surprise assessments 
of confinement conditions conducted by said private prison commissions, in order 
to ensure that reports from these for-profit corrections are accurate. Such personal 
visits would provide both transparency and accountability from the private 
punishment industry.  
Each report by the commission should also be made available to the public on 
a timely basis, electronically and through media coverage.398 This will increase the 
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transparency of the workings of the private corrections, as well as put pressure on 
the commission, the government, and the for-profit owners to change any 
substandard practices. 
Certainly all correctional facilities and alternative corrections could use this 
type of oversight. But in a world of limited resources and time, the first place to start 
such monitoring would be in the world of for-profit, privatized corrections, which, 
as shown, have suffered the worst abuses.  
There are numerous civilian review boards for the police, but there are few 
truly independent, community commissions to oversee state and local corrections, 
let alone private corrections. New York State has a correctional oversight board, run 
by the Correctional Association of New York, an NGO. 399  The Correctional 
Association of New York has been visiting prisons and reporting on conditions of 
confinement, under a legislative mandate for the past 165 years.400 The Board of 
Directors of this organization is comprised of private citizens including “prominent 
citizens, lawyers, advocates, formerly incarcerated individuals, individuals 
associated with community-based organizations . . . and academics,”401 but few lay 
citizens serve on the oversight board itself. 
Although this is definitely a step in the right direction, the best bet would to 
have true lay diversity on the visiting committee itself, instead of members appointed 
by the mayor. This would permit the local citizenry to be more involved in the 
procedures at their local correctional facilities. Indeed, as one prison scholar notes, 
incorporating the local community in oversight roles helps improve correctional 
facilities by their very presence: “In facilities that confine people, the presence of 
civilian overseers humanizes everyone—inmates and staff—and makes the prison a 
better, more effective, and more enlightened institution for all.”402 
In contrast, England has a much more comprehensive vision of prison 
oversight, containing three separate branches: a Prison Inspectorate that routinely 
inspects all correctional facilities and places of detention; a Prison Ombudsman to 
investigate prisoners’ complaints; and a system of Independent Monitoring Boards 
comprised of lay citizens, each monitoring a specific facility.403 
Of course, as has been noted elsewhere, prison oversight is a many-tentacled 
beast, involving regulation, audit, accreditation, investigation, legal oversight, 
reporting, and inspection/monitoring,404 among other roles. This Article’s vision for 
a civilian oversight board for private prisons would primarily focus on investigating 
reported problems and inspection/monitoring, similar to England’s Independent 
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Monitoring Boards. The other aspects of oversight would be best assumed by either 
a state or federal oversight body.  
The Independent Monitoring Boards of Britain and Wales merit some 
particular attention, as they are comprised almost entirely of local citizens. Anyone 
may apply to be on a monitoring board, and vacancies are routinely advertised.405 
Members are expected to serve two days per month. The members may enter the 
prison at any time, can go anywhere in the prison (subject to security considerations 
and personal safety), and can inquire into anything (except confidential medical 
files).  
Independent Board Monitors visit their designated prison regularly, usually 
unannounced, as often as once a week; listen to the requests, concerns, and 
complaints of prisoners and report them if necessary; visit the kitchen, healthcare 
unit, and segregation units; and meet once a month, along with the director of the 
prison, to discuss inspection results and any concerns.406 In addition, Board members 
are encouraged to publish their annual reports, which are publicly available on the 
Boards’ websites and issued to the press.407 
Despite the fact that these Independent Board Monitors are not executive 
bodies, and thus cannot demand action, their oversight has been extremely positive, 
improving offender treatment and increasing their protection from abuse and ill-
treatment.408 This positive influence stems largely “through the actual presence—in 
the prison, in the cells, on the landings and in the exercise yards—of people from 
the outside world.”409 In other words, the interjection of the local community has 
worked wonders towards ensuring that the conditions and punishment imposed upon 
offenders were appropriate. 
The best short-term way to tackle the problems of privatized corrections is to 
require the local community to oversee these institutions to help improve conditions 
of incarceration. In the long run, however, we must eliminate both the piecemeal 




Privatizing corrections monetizes the criminal justice system in a deeply 
disturbing way, rooted in a shameful history of slavery, Jim Crow, and greed. 
Profiting from the physical incarceration and regulation of other humans, a function 
normally and properly only performed by a locally elected government, is not only 
distasteful and often inhumane, but has serious, deleterious effects on offenders, 
communities, and the proper functioning of punishment in our society.  
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Nonetheless, it appears that privatizing corrections has taken a firm hold of the 
criminal justice system, from the beginning (privatized probation and 
transportation), to the middle (private jails, prisons, and services), to the end 
(privatized halfway houses, recovery homes, and post-release supervision). Such 
privatization is so pervasive that most citizens fail to realize its extent, or their role 
as unwilling investors in large private corrections companies.  
The ultimate solution is, of course, forbidding any private, for-profit ownership 
or investment in corrections and punishment. In a time where privatization is 
generally lauded as a public good, this goal, however, is likely to take time and 
tremendous effort. So, what to do in the meantime?  
The community must play a part. By taking a strong, proactive role in 
overseeing private corrections through the use of citizen oversight boards, the lay 
citizenry can help ensure that these for-profit entities are meeting minimal standards 
in living conditions, health care, food services, the imposition of discipline, the 
regulation of violence, and the general welfare of offenders.  
The ultimate goal must be eradicating the profit motive from corrections. This 
eradication may be a long and drawn-out struggle, however, given the continual 
budget woes of states and counties. Coming up with innovative short-term solutions 
involving the local community may therefore be the best and fastest way to begin to 
combat the growing trend of cashing in on convicts. 
